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The traditional narrative of events following the ratification debates has
connected the Bill of Rights with the Anti-Federalists and the Judiciary and Process Acts
of 1789 with the Federalists. Although the scholarly consensus has turned against the
Bill of Rights part of this story, most scholars continue to portray the first Congress’
implementation of Article III as a victory for the Federalists. In this article, I trace the
development of the Anti-Federalists’ theory of federal/state power and its application to
the judiciary in an effort to show why the second part of the above narrative also has it
wrong.
Here is the short version. Having adopted the same conception of federalism as an
underappreciated faction of delegates at the Constitutional Convention, Anti-Federalist
writers like “Brutus” argued that some mechanism was needed to prevent the states
from being swallowed up by federal judicial overreach. Despite Alexander Hamilton’s
attempts in Federalist Nos. 78–83 to downplay this danger and emphasize the necessity
of a robust system of federal inferior courts with general “arising under” jurisdiction, it
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was the Anti-Federalists’ arguments that continued to resonate in the state ratifying
conventions and beyond. Oliver Ellsworth, the Connecticut Federalist who was the
primary draftsman of the Judiciary and Process Acts, had shown his sympathy with
Brutus all along. And the bare bones, state-dependent inferior court structure he helped
create is testimony to this sympathy. Like the Bill of Rights, then, the Anti-Federalists’
influence on the original federal judiciary was a vicarious one. But unlike the Bill of
Rights, this victory tracked their theory of federalism and gave them a meaningful
structural change that might protect the states against a national consolidation.
INTRODUCTION
Not long ago, if the Anti-Federalists were remembered for any enduring
contribution to the American system of government, it was for the Bill of Rights. The
Anti-)HGHUDOLVWV¶ HIIRUWV WR SUHYHQW WKH VWDWHV IURP DGRSWLQJ WKH SURSRVHG &RQVWLWXWLRQ
failed, so the traditional narrative went. But because of the numerous objections they
raised at state ratifying conventions²especially in the colonial power-centers of
Massachusetts, New York, and Virginia²the Anti-)HGHUDOLVWV¶ FRQVRODWLRQ SUL]H ZDV
congressional approval of what would eventually become the first ten amendments to the
Constitution.
In recent years, however, scholars have thrown cold water on this account.1 It was
not Anti-Federalists like Melancton Smith, Patrick Henry, or Richard Henry Lee who
drafted the Bill of Rights and shepherded it through Congress; it was James Madison, the
Federalist-of-Federalists himself. And although the Bill of Rights did respond to some of
the Anti-)HGHUDOLVWV¶ REMHFWLRQV 0DGLVRQ DQG RWKHUV ZKR FRQWULEXWHG WR WKHVH
amendments declined to address the Anti-)HGHUDOLVWV¶ PRVW IXQGDPHQWDO VWUXFWXUDO
concerns.2
But if the Anti-)HGHUDOLVWV¶ LQIOXHQFH RQ WKH %LOO of Rights has too often been
exaggerated, scholars have regularly underappreciated their impact on another of the
ILUVW &RQJUHVV¶ PRVW VLJQLILFDQW DQG FRQWHVWHG SULRULWLHV²the establishment of the
original federal judiciary in the Judiciary and Process Acts of 1789. Consider Matthew
%URJGRQ¶VUHFHQWUHPDUNWKDWWKHFUHDWLRQRILQIHULRUFRXUWVXQGHUWKH-XGLFLDU\$FW³ZDV
a substantial victory . . . for the Federalist vision of a self-sufficient national
JRYHUQPHQW´3 2UWDNH)HOL[)UDQNIXUWHU¶VPRUHJUDQGiose claim²repeated in Hart and
:HFKVOHU¶V FHOHEUDWHG IHGHUDO FRXUWV WH[WERRN4²WKDW WKH ³WUDQVFHQGHQW DFKLHYHPHQW RI
the First Judiciary Act [was] the establishment for this country of the tradition of a
V\VWHP RI LQIHULRU IHGHUDO FRXUWV´5 Even Julius Goebel, whose classic work on the
1. See, e.g., ROBERT A. GOLDWIN, FROM PARCHMENT TO
OF RIGHTS TO SAVE THE CONSTITUTION (1997).

POWER: HOW JAMES MADISON USED THE BILL

2. As Goldwin summarizes, ³[t]hat there is a bill of rights in the Constitution we owe in considerable part
to the Anti-Federalists and their energetic agitation for amendments; but that we have the Bill of Rights we
have, rather than a number of quite different amendments, we owe in larger part . . . to James Madison.´Id. at
57.
3. Matthew Brogdon, Constitutional Text and Institutional Development: Contesting the Madisonian
Compromise in the First Congress, 5 AM. J. POL. THOUGHT 219, 236 (2016).
4. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER¶S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 21 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 7th ed. 2015).
5. FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN THE
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Judiciary and Process Acts is more balanced in its treatment of the Anti-Federalists,
PLVVHVWKHWKHRUHWLFDOSRLQWFODLPLQJWKDW³>W@KHOHDGLQJVSLULWV . . . charged with drafting
WK>HVH@ PHDVXUH>V@ ZHUH IHGHUDOO\ PLQGHG´ DQG VR LQFOLQHG WR WDNH D ³EROG YLHZ RI WKH
OHJLVODWLYHDXWKRULW\FRQYH\HGE\$UWLFOH,,,´6
These portrayals fail to see the forest for the trees. The key takeaway is not that the
Judiciary Act established some inferior courts²a point which important Anti-Federalists
conceded during the ratification debates7 and which may even have been required by
Article III8²but that it granted state courts the primary responsibility for interpreting
and applying federal law. 7KH )HGHUDOLVWV¶ LQDELOLW\ WR VHFXUH JHQHUDO ³DULVLQJ XQGHU´
jurisdiction for the national judiciary severely undercut their vision for a separate and
self-sustaining national government that would act directly on individuals. And the first
Process Act and the measures in the Bill of Rights that address the courts represent
additional concessions to the Anti-)HGHUDOLVWV¶MXGLFLDOYLVLRQ In short, instead of being
remembered as a victory IRU WKH )HGHUDOLVWV WKH ILUVW &RQJUHVV¶ LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ RI
Article III is best characterized as an effort to address the Anti-)HGHUDOLVWV¶ concerns that
the federal judiciary might destroy state governments and oppress individual rights.
Why have scholars regularly undersold the Anti-)HGHUDOLVWV¶ LQIOXHQFH RQ WKH
initial shape of the American judiciary? There are several good reasons. For one, as
alluded to above, the Judiciary and Process Acts were written almost exclusively by
Federalists. Oliver Ellsworth, a prominent Connecticut Federalist and future Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, was the primary draftsman of both
measures.9 Moreover, with the exception of a few Anti-Federalist mainstays, such as
Richard Henry Lee and William Grayson (both from Virginia), the Federalists dominated
the first Senate and indeed the first Congress as a whole. Of course, not all Federalists
shared the same reasons for voting for the new Constitution, nor did they share an
identical vision for its operation going forward.10 Nor, further, should it be forgotten that
WKH ILUVW &RQJUHVV¶ GHOLEHUDWLRQV WRRN SODFH DJDLQVW WKH EDFNJURXQG RI WKH ³UDWLI\ QRZ
FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 4 (1928).
6. See, e.g., JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 457 (1971). To be sure, Goebel does eventually nod in the
direction of the Federalists¶ sensitivity to the Anti-Federalists¶ criticisms. Id. But he misfires from the outset in
suggesting that the Federalists who drafted the Judiciary Act were antagonistic to the Anti-Federalists¶ theory
of federal/state power.
7. See, e.g., Federal Farmer XV, in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST WRITINGS OF THE MELANCTON SMITH CIRCLE
130±31 (Michael P. Zuckert & Derek Webb eds., 2009) (opining that Congress would adopt either the New
York or Massachusetts plan for inferior federal courts).
8. I take no position in this article on the meaning of Article III and, specifically, whether it required the
creation of some federal inferior courts. But if the scholars who make this claim (or something close to it) are
right, it would only add further support for my argument that the Judiciary and Process Acts were a victory for
the Anti-Federalists. See William Treanor, Framer’s Intent: Gouverneur Morris, the Committee of Style, and
the Creation of the Federalist Constitution 99±101 (Georgetown University Law Center, Working Paper, 2019)
(arguing that Gouverneur Morris selected language that would require the creation of lower federal courts); see
generally Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties, and the Madisonian Compromise, 1995
WIS. L. REV. 39 (1995) (arguing that the mainstream view during the founding era was that, because state
courts could not constitutionally hear some categories of claims, Congress would need to create inferior federal
courts if it wanted these claims to be enforced).
9. See, e.g., GOEBEL, supra note 6, at 459±60.
10. I develop and support this claim throughout the rest of the article, but my most direct treatment of this
point appears in the context of the discussion of Hamilton in Part III below.
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DPHQGODWHU´FRPSURPLVHVUHDFKHGDWYDULRXVVWDWHUDWLI\LQJFRQYHQWLRQVD\HDUHDUOLHU
Notwithstanding all of this, however, the fact remains that the Anti-)HGHUDOLVWV¶LQIOXHQFH
on the federal judiciary is one that must largely be traced through the hands of their
political opponents.
Another possible explanation for the Anti-)HGHUDOLVWV¶ODFNRIUHFRgnition owes to
the dearth of records from the first session of the Senate. Until 1794, the Senate met in
secret. 7KXVWKHVXEVWDQFHRIWKHILUVW6HQDWH¶VGHEDWHVDERXWWKHMXGLFLDU\FDQRQO\EH
inferred from such sources as the personal correspondence of Senators, scattered (and
often one-sided) notes of the proceedings like those taken by William Maclay, and the
debates about the Judiciary and Process Acts that took place in the House of
Representatives. As previously noted, all accounts suggest that Senate Federalists²
including especially Ellsworth, William Paterson, and Caleb Strong²were almost
exclusively responsible for drafting these acts, and we also know that many AntiFederalists in the Senate voted against the Judiciary Act in its final form.11 So it is
possible that the Senate records would fail to reveal evidence of Anti-Federalist
influence even if they did exist. On the other hand, Richard Henry Lee was a member of
the committee that prepared the first draft of the Judiciary Act and was even tasked with
UHDGLQJWKHFRPPLWWHH¶VGUDIWELOOWRWKH6HQDWH12
One final factor that has clouded the Anti-)HGHUDOLVWV¶ UROH LV WKDW PDQ\ WKRXJK
not all) of the judicially-focused provisions enacted by the first Congress²whether
contained in the Bill of Rights, Judiciary Act, or Process Act²are often taken for
granted. Should an appellate court be able to reach a different conclusion about the facts
of a case than the jury did below? This question sounds so strange because the Seventh
Amendment settled this issue after its ratification in 1791. Similarly, such questions as
whether the United States should have chancery courts, whether there is a jury trial right
applicable in civil cases, and whether litigants need to fear being hauled into court in
Washington, D.C. for run-of-the-mill matters rarely (if ever) arise today.
So what basis is there for questioning the Federalist-centered narrative surrounding
the original federal judiciary? My claim is that, despite their Federalist authorship, the
Judiciary and Process Acts incorporated the Anti-)HGHUDOLVWV¶ SROLWLFDO WKHRU\ DQG
specifically their brand of federalism. To develop this argument, I identify a particular
theory of federalism at the Constitutional Convention, trace how that theory was
embraced by the Anti-Federalists and applied to the topic of the federal judiciary by
³%UXWXV´13 FRQWUDVWWKLVWKHRU\ZLWK$OH[DQGHU+DPLOWRQ¶VWUHDWPHQWRIWKHMXGLFLDU\LQ

11. See GOEBEL, supra note 6, at 459±60, 503, 507; WILLIAM J. RITZ, REWRITING THE HISTORY OF THE
JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789: EXPOSING MYTHS, CHALLENGING PREMISES, AND USING NEW EVIDENCE 213±14
n.10 (1990) (noting that bill¶s manuscript was in the handwriting of Ellsworth, Paterson, and Strong). On the
topic of why several Anti-Federalists might have voted against a bill that accommodated many of their
concerns, see infra pp. 27±28, 35±36 and accompanying notes.
12. Senate Legislative Journal (Apr. 7, 1789), in 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 11 (Charlene Bangs Bickford et al. eds., 1972); Senate
Legislative Journal (June 12, 1789), in 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 67 (Charlene Bangs Bickford et al. eds., 1972); GOEBEL, supra note 6, at 466±67
(noting the strange fact that Lee, likely the most prominent Anti-Federalist in the Senate, was chosen to report
the original bill).
13. Brutus was most likely Melancton Smith or one of his close associates. See THE ANTI-FEDERALIST
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WKH)HGHUDOLVW3DSHUVVKRZKRZLWZDVLQFRUSRUDWHGLQWRWKH³UDWLI\QRZDPHQGODWHU´
compromises at state ratifying conventions, and then finally demonstrate how the theory
made its way into the Judiciary and Process Acts of 1789. Ultimately, I contend that the
Anti-)HGHUDOLVWV¶ XQOLNHO\ YLFWRU\ RZHV WR WZR IDFWRUV   WKH VLJQLILFDQW SROLWLFDO
pressure that the state ratifying conventions placed on those who drafted and voted on
WKH-XGLFLDU\DQG3URFHVV$FWVDQG  WKHIDFWWKDWGHVSLWH2OLYHU(OOVZRUWK¶V)HGHUDOLVW
affiliation, his sympathy with the Anti-)HGHUDOLVWV¶EUDQGRIIHGHUDOLVPSXW him closer to
Brutus than Hamilton. Like the Bill of Rights, then, the Anti-)HGHUDOLVWV¶ LQIOXHQFH RQ
the judiciary was a vicarious one. Yet, unlike the Bill of Rights, the Judiciary and
Process Acts actually incorporated the Anti-)HGHUDOLVWV¶ WKHRU\ RI Iederal/state power,
and, along the way, accomplished some of the structural changes the Anti-Federalists
really wanted.
There is one important qualification to this portrayal, however. Namely, with the
exception of the judicially-related provisions of the Bill of Rights that made it into the
Constitution itself, the Anti-)HGHUDOLVWV¶WULXPSKGLGQRWKDYHVWD\LQJSRZHU A detailed
account of the growth of the federal judiciary is well beyond the scope of this article, but
it is worth noting that, although the structure established by the Judiciary Act went
largely unchanged until the Reconstruction era, the Anti-)HGHUDOLVWV¶ IDLOXUH WR FHPHQW
the guiding principles of the Act in the Constitution allowed the national judiciary to
eventually become something closer to what the Federalists would have wanted.14 In this
way, the Judiciary and Process Acts might simultaneously be portrayed as a temporary
Anti-Federalist victory in that the national judiciary was originally weak and statedependent, and a long-term victory for the Federalists in that the limitations on the
judiciary provided by these acts were reversible.
These insights also have contemporary relevance. Beyond at least partially
UHKDELOLWDWLQJ D JURXS WKDW VRPH KDYH FDOOHG ³WKH ILUVW LGHQWLfiable class of losers in
$PHULFDQSROLWLFDOKLVWRU\´15 some scholars have already demonstrated how the typical
Federalist-centered narrative surrounding these Acts has confused such issues as the
IHGHUDOJRYHUQPHQW¶VDELOLW\WRFRPPDQGHHUVWDWH RIILFHUV16 and whether federal courts
should create federal common law.17 $QRWKHU FRQWH[W LQ ZKLFK WKLV DUWLFOH¶V WKHVLV
WRITINGS OF THE MELANCTON SMITH CIRCLE, supra note 7, at xi±xxxii, 397±419.
14. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 4, at 28±29 (discussing the changes to the federal judiciary
accomplished in Reconstruction era). See also William M. Treanor, The Genius of Hamilton and the Birth of
the Modern Theory of the Judiciary, in CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO THE FEDERALIST 503±05 (Jack Rakove &
Colleen Sheehan eds., 2020) (arguing that Hamilton¶s theory has been adopted by contemporary scholars and
practitioners). To be sure, while the Federalists wanted a stronger federal judiciary relative to the AntiFederalists, this does not therefore establish that all Federalists would embrace the degree to which the
judiciary has expanded in the modern system.
15. Paul Finkelman, Turning Losers into Winners: What Can We Learn, if Anything, from the
Antifederalists?, 79 TEX. L. REV. 849, 892 (2001).
16. See Wesley J. Campbell, Commandeering and Constitutional Change, 122 YALE L.J. 1004, 1108±12
(2013) (arguing that, contrary to Printz v. United States, the Anti-Federalists¶ support for ³commandeering´
suggests that the ³commandeering of state executive and judicial officers should not be categorically
unconstitutional´).
17. See generally Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Original Source of the Cause of Action in
Federal Courts: The Example of the Alien Tort Statute, 101 VA. L. REV. 609 (2015) (arguing that the Process
Acts of 1789 and 1792, which required federal courts to use state forms of proceeding when hearing common
law cases, reveal the Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain Court¶s mistake in assuming that federal courts originally

Published by TU Law Digital Commons,

5

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 56 [], Iss. 1, Art. 4

TULSA LAW REVIEW

6

[Vol. 56:1

matters is the longstanding debate over congressional power to limit the jurisdiction of
the federal courts.18 It would require more time and care to explore the implications of
my thesis for that debate. %XW LQ JHQHUDO WR WKH H[WHQW WKDW $UWLFOH ,,,¶V LQLWLDO
implementation is relevant to its interpretation, a more Anti-Federalist-friendly
understanding of the Judiciary and Process Acts would seem to militate in favor of
permitting Congress greater flexibility in transferring power from federal to state courts.
Lastly, recognition of the Anti-)HGHUDOLVWV¶LQIOXHQFHRQWKH-XGLFLDU\DQG3URFHVV$FWV
stands to breathe new life into conversations about the Anti-)HGHUDOLVWV¶ UHOHYDQFH WR
theories of constitutional and/or statutory interpretation. Some have argued that because
Anti-)HGHUDOLVW ZULWHUV OLNH %UXWXV RU )HGHUDO )DUPHU ZHUH WKH ³ORVHUV´ WKH\ DUH
irrelevant to interpretations of founding era laws, or that they are relevant only to the
same degree as other public texts that reveal the meanings people at the time would have
ascribed to certain words.19 Placing the Anti-)HGHUDOLVWVDWOHDVWSDUWLDOO\LQWKHZLQQHU¶V
column should cause further reflection about the degree to which their contributions
form part of the canon for constitutional and/or statutory interpretation in the founding
era.
This article proceeds in the following manner. In Part I, I set the stage for the
ratification debates by examining the increasing importance of the judiciary throughout
the Constitutional Convention as well as the diverse theories of federalism articulated by
the delegates. In Part II, I examine the Anti-)HGHUDOLVWV¶DUJXPHQWVDERXWIHGHUDOMXGLFLDO
overreach in the months following the Convention with a special focus on Brutus. In Part
,,, , GLVFXVV WKH )HGHUDOLVWV¶²DQG HVSHFLDOO\ $OH[DQGHU +DPLOWRQ¶V²response to
Brutus, as well as the debates over Article III at the state ratifying conventions. And,
finDOO\LQ3DUW,9,FRQQHFW%UXWXV¶DUJXPHQWVZLWKNH\SURYLVLRQVLQWKH%LOORI5LJKWV
and the Judiciary and Process Acts of 1789.
I.

ARTICLE III AND COMPETING STRATEGIES FOR NEGOTIATING FEDERAL/STATE
CONFLICT AT THE CONVENTION

There is near-universal agreement among scholars that the delegates to the
Constitutional Convention in 1787 did not view Article III as a high priority, at least not
initially. &RQYHQWLRQ VFKRODU 5LFKDUG %HHPDQ UHPDUNV IRU H[DPSOH WKDW ³WKH QDWLRQDO
judiciary . . . t[ook] a backVHDW WR RWKHU LVVXHV WKURXJKRXW PRVW RI WKH &RQYHQWLRQ´20
/HJDOKLVWRULDQ-XOLXV*RHEHOFODLPVVLPLODUO\WKDW³WKHMXGLFLDU\ZDVVXEMHFWHGWRPXFK
less critical working over than the other departments of goverQPHQW´21 Hart and
Wechsler go even further, DVVHUWLQJWKDW³>D@OPRVWZLWKRXWH[FHSWLRQGHFLVLRQVUHJDUGLQJ
consulted ³ambient´ or ³general´ law).
18. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 4, at 307 (where Hart and Wechsler distinguish between (1) ³the power
of Congress to limit the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts´; (2) ³the power of Congress to limit the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over cases that continue to be within the jurisdiction of the lower
federal courts´; and (3) ³the power of Congress to withdraw certain matters from the jurisdiction of all federal
courts (with state courts continuing to exercise jurisdiction over those matters).´
19. See generally Nils Gilbertson, Return of the Skeptics: The Growing Role of the Anti-Federalists in
Modern Constitutional Jurisprudence, 16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL¶Y 255 (2018) (summarizing various positions
on the Anti-Federalists¶ relevance to Constitutional interpretation).
20. RICHARD BEEMAN, PLAIN, HONEST MEN: THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 236 (2010).
21. See GOEBEL, supra note 6, at 205.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol56/iss1/4

6

Moore: Trimming the Least Dangerous Branch: The Anti-Federalists and the

2020]

TRIMMING THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH

7

the judiciary [at the Convention] were ancillary, and reflected settlements and divisions
FRQFHUQLQJPRUHGHHSO\FRQWURYHUVLDOLVVXHV´ 22
While this last characterization may go a bit too far, these claims invite an
important question: Why did the delegates arrive at the Convention with such little
concern for the judiciary? Bearing in mind the diverse size and population of the states as
well as the critical importance of delimiting the poweUVRIWKH³SXUVH´DQGWKH³VZRUG´
the most obvious explanation might be that the structure of the legislative and executive
branches were more pressing concerns. Also, considering, first, that the Continental
&RQJUHVV¶DXWKRUL]DWLRQIRUWKH&RQYHQWLRQZDVDWOHDVWWHFKQLFDOO\OLPLWHGWR³revising
WKH $UWLFOHV RI &RQIHGHUDWLRQ´23 and, second, that the Articles had established only a
very limited national court system, many delegates were likely less focused on the
judiciary because of this point of departure.24
2QH IXUWKHU UHDVRQ IRU WKH MXGLFLDU\¶V LQLWLDOO\ LQIHULRU SULRULW\²and one that is
especially relevant to the present inquiry²might be that it was several months before the
delegates shifted their attention toward the judiciary as the means for addressing the
classic problem for governments with a federal structure: How should the system
negotiate conflicts between national and state governments?
Many delegates at the convention, and especially James Madison, were originally
occupied with a potential legislative solution to this problem.25 0DGLVRQ¶V SURSRVHG
³IHGHUDO QHJDWLYH´ ZRXOG KDYH JLYHQ &RQJUHVV WKH DELOLW\ WR YHWR any state enactment
before it became effective.26 And the Virginia Plan, which Madison helped craft,
recommended providing Congress with a similar power, but first would have required
WKDW LW ILQG WKH VWDWH ODZ LQ TXHVWLRQ WR KDYH ³FRQWUDYHQ>HG@  . . the articles of the
8QLRQ´27 Convention records suggest that Madison was very committed to these
22. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 4, at 4.
23. 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774±1789, at 74 (Roscoe R. Hill ed., 1936) (emphasis
added); but see GOEBEL, supra note 6, at 201±02 (arguing that the Continental Congress did not give this
authority to the Convention because they knew they could not add anything to the states¶ own respective
decisions to send delegates to the Convention).
24. Even the New Jersey Plan, however, would have established a federal court system with power to
review state court decisions. Thus, it is probable that most delegates began the Convention assuming that the
new proposal would include a federal judiciary of some kind. See 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 611±16 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter 3 FARRAND].
25. See, e.g., ALLISON LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 147±58 (Harvard
University Press 2010); Michael Zuckert, Federalism and the Founding: Toward a Reinterpretation of the
Constitutional Convention, 34 REV. POL. 166±210 (1986).
26. Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Apr. 16, 1787) (³[A] negative in all cases
whatsoever on the legislative acts of the States, as heretofore exercised by the Kingly prerogative, appears to
me to be absolutely necessary, and to be the least possible encroachment on the State jurisdictions.´).
27. 3 FARRAND, supra note 24, at 593±94. Some characterize this portion in the Virginia Plan (which
Madison helped craft) as a different ³federal negative,´ thus presenting Madison as having proposed two
distinct negatives. See Michael Zuckert, Judicial Review and the Incomplete Constitution: A Madisonian
Perspective on the Supreme Court and the Idea of Constitutionalism, in THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA
OF CONSTITUTIONALISM 61±64 (Steven Kautz et al. eds., 2009). This portrayal can be helpful because, as
explored further below, it helps highlight how Madison sought for this provision to solve two different
problems. The Virginia Plan¶s congressional veto of state enactments contravening the articles of the union was
specifically designed to ensure that states did not impinge on national interests. And Madison¶s unqualified
congressional veto power over state laws was a key part of solving the problem of large republics discussed in
Federalist No. 10 because²as compared to the state legislatures²Madison thought Congress would represent
a broader diversity of constituencies and interests, making congressional majorities less factious than those
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provisions. Not only did he repeatedly attempt to convince the other delegates of the
necessity of some type of Congressional veto power over state laws, he also famously
FRPSODLQHGLQDOHWWHUWR7KRPDV-HIIHUVRQDIWHUZDUGDERXWKRZ³WKHZDQWRIVRPHVXFK
provision seems to have been mortal to the antient [sic] Confederacies, and to be the
GLVHDVHRIWKHPRGHUQ´28 ,QGHHGLIWKHOHQJWKRI0DGLVRQ¶VWUHDWPHQWRIWKLVWRSLFLQKLV
letter to Jefferson is any indication, the absence of a congressional veto power from the
plan was his deepest regret.29
7R EHWWHU XQGHUVWDQG WKH GHYHORSPHQW RI WKH GHOHJDWHV¶ WUHDWPHQW RI $UWLFOH ,,,
during the Convention²and to appreciate why Madison felt so strongly about his
³IHGHUDO QHJDWLYH´²LW LV KHOSIXO WR FRQWUDVW 0DGLVRQ¶V SRVLWLRQ ZLWK RWKer strategies
presented at the Convention for balancing state and federal power. Coming fresh off of a
disillusioning experience with the Articles of Confederation, almost every delegate
agreed that some adjustment in favor of a stronger national government was necessary to
preserve the Union. This, of course, led those on the one extreme²like Alexander
Hamilton²to suggest a truly unified national government in which the states would give
up all of their sovereignty.30 But even the most pro-state-power plan advanced during the
summer of 1787²:LOOLDP 3DWHUVRQ¶V 1HZ -HUVH\ 3ODQ²granted the national
government some additional powers targeted especially at better regulating commerce,
taxes, and foreign affairs.31 The New Jersey Plan thus represents the lightest-touch
approach toward reforming the Articles of Confederation, all along seeking to preserve
WKH $UWLFOHV¶ IXQGDPHQWDO FRPPLWPHQW WR DFW XSRQ VWDWHV RQO\ DW WKH VWDWH UDWKHU WKDQ
individual) level.32
Madison was the person who perhaps best saw the difficulty inherent in the New
-HUVH\ 3ODQ¶V DWWHPSW WR IL[ WKH $UWLFOHV¶ SUREOHPV ZLWKRXW GHSDUWLQJ IURP WKHLU
theoretical foundation. Yet, before turning to Madison, it is worth first noting how the
architects of the New Jersey Plan themselves attempted to address the problem of statelevel defiance of national law that had so plagued the Articles of Confederation.
3DWHUVRQ¶V SURSRVHG VROXWLRQ ZDV DQ H[WUDRUGLQDU\ RQH KH ZRXOG KDYH JUDQWHG WKH
Executive the power to compel, by use of all necessary military force, the obedience of
noncomplying States.33 And while this power appears on its face to be in significant
WHQVLRQ ZLWK VWDWH VRYHUHLJQW\ WKH LQWHQW RI WKH 1HZ -HUVH\ 3ODQ¶V GHYRWHHV ZDV
apparently to make incursions on the states a rare (and desperate) measure.34 Only in
cases where enforcement was worth risking armed conflict would the national
found in the states. Id. at 62±63. Congress thus needed this strong veto power to be able to adequately protect
the rights of citizens. Id.
28. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787).
29. LACROIX, supra note 25, at 136±39, 158±59; Zuckert, supra note 25, at 187.
30. Zuckert, supra note 25, at 198 (citing 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 283±
86 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter 1 FARRAND]).
31. 1 FARRAND, supra note 30, at 242±45.
32. Zuckert, supra note 25, at 169±70.
33. 1 FARRAND, supra note 30, at 245 (³[I]f any State, or any body of men in any State shall oppose or
prevent [the] carrying into execution [of] such acts or treaties, the federal Executive shall be authorized to call
forth [the] power of the Confederated States, or so much thereof as may be necessary to enforce and compel an
obedience to such Acts.´).
34. Zuckert, supra note 25, at 170±71.
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government act against the will of member states.
Three other conceptions of federalism represented at the Convention²those
embraced by the Virginia Plan, James Madison, and John Dickinson respectively²
focused their efforts at negotiating the conflict between national and state governments
in a more peaceful manner.35 And the similar strategy they adopted for solving this
problem is what generated much of the ConstiWXWLRQ¶VHYHQWXDOGHVLJQ36
7KH 9LUJLQLD 3ODQ GHVHUYHV FUHGLW IRU WKH &RQVWLWXWLRQ¶V NH\ WKHRUHWLFDO LQVLJKW
Contrary to the Articles of Confederation, the Virginia Plan began with the premise that
both national and state governments should operate at the individual level with power
over different objects, so that they would essentially act on separate planes with the
points of contact between the two being as limited as possible. 37 In this way, the two
generally independent and self-sustaining levels of government could minimize the
avenues through which government-on-government conflict would arise. Thus, under the
Virginia Plan, the national and state governments each possessed their own robust
executive, legislative, and judicial branches; Congress was given limited powers to
accomplish national objects; and the national government was otherwise to stay out of
state government affairs.38
For Madison, however, this type of separation by itself was insufficient. Having
recently reflected, in anticipation of the Convention, upon the failures of ancient
confederacies, Madison was especially concerned with state encroachment on the
national government.39 Unless some mechanism existed through which the national
government could exercise a degree of agency in state government proceedings,
confrontation between the two spheres would ultimately be unavoidable. Much like his
analysis in Federalist No. 51 concerning the need for each branch of government to have
some mechanism to protect itself from the other branches to preserve the separation of
powers,40 here, Madison held that the integrity of federal and state governments would
be short-lived unless the national government had an effective way of protecting its own
turf.41
2I FRXUVH WKH 9LUJLQLD 3ODQ¶V RZQ IHGHUDO QHJDWLYH ZKLFK DJDLQ SHUPLWWHG
35. Note, on this point, that the Virginia Plan included a similar provision permitting the ³National
Legislature´ to compel state compliance by force if necessary. 1 FARRAND, supra note 30, at 21 (³[T]he
National Legislature ought to be impowered [sic] . . . to call forth the force of the Union agst. any member of
the Union failing to fulfill its duty under the articles thereof´). But Madison makes clear in a number of places
his belief that the primary method of securing state compliance²and the only one that could actually be
successful²was the construction of a self-sufficient national government armed with something like the
federal negative. See, e.g., James Madison Letter to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 19, 1787); see generally Zuckert,
supra note 25.
36. See generally FEDERALIST NOS. 15, 16.
37. See id.; Zuckert, supra note 25, at 181±82.
38. 1 FARRAND, supra note 30, at 20±23.
39. See James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States (Apr. 1787), in 2 THE WRITINGS
OF JAMES MADISON 361±69 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901); James Madison, On Ancient and Modern Confederacies
(1786), in 2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 369±90 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901).
40. FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 267±72 (James Madison).
41. See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 19, 1787) (³Without this defensive power
[(i.e. the federal negative)] experience and reflection have satisfied me that however ample the federal powers
may be made, or however [c]learly their boundaries may be delineated, on paper, they will be easily and
continually baffled by the Legislative sovereignties of the States´).
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Congress to veto only unconstitutional state laws) constituted one notable exception to
WKH 3ODQ¶V RWKHUZLVH LQYLRODEOH FRPPLWPHQW WR PLQLPL]LQJ VWDWH DQG IHGHUDO FRQWDFWV
%XWHYHQWKLVZDVWRRZHDNLQ0DGLVRQ¶VYLHZ The danger of state encroachment was
such that the national government needed to actually insert itself into the routine
procedure by which states made law so that federal oversight was not the exception but
the rule.
As it turns out, however, Madison would have undoubtedly preferred the Virginia
3ODQ¶VIHGHUDOQHJDWLYHWRWKHDSSURDFKWKH&RQYHQWLRQHYHQWXDOO\DGRSWHG As Michael
Zuckert notes by way of explaining the defeat of the federal negative:
>,@Q SDUW WKH IDLOXUH RI >0DGLVRQ¶V@ QHJDWLYHV PXVW EH DWWULEXWHG WR >KLV@ VXFFHVV LQ
impressing on his colleagues the new principle that should govern the operation of the new
constitution: that one level of government (the general government) should not operate on
the other level of government (the states), but rather on individuals. 0DGLVRQ¶V EHORved
negative would [have] violate[d] his own principle . . . .42

Ultimately, then, one might say that the core tenet of the Madison-inspired Virginia Plan
ZRQRXWRYHUWKHH[FHSWLRQWRWKDWWHQHWHPERGLHGLQERWKYHUVLRQVRI0DGLVRQ¶VIHGHUDO
negative.
If the Virginia Plan generally sought to minimize the points of contact between
two separate and self-VXVWDLQLQJ OHYHOV RI JRYHUQPHQW DQG 0DGLVRQ¶V RZQ YHUVLRQ RI
federalism permitted federal agency within state decision-making, this logically leaves
room for one final theory of federalism. 7KDW WKHRU\ ZKLFK =XFNHUW FDOOV ³'LFNLQVRQ
)HGHUDOLVP´DIWHURQHRILWVNH\FKDPSLRQVDWWKH&RQYHQWLRQDJUHHGWKDWLWZDVZLVHWR
minimize the points of possible federal/state conflict but, contrary to Madison, sought to
grant state agency in federal decision-making.43 For those subscribing to this view,
federal encroachment on state power was just as dangerous as the opposite threat. In this
worry, Dickinson Federalists like George Mason anticipated a common Anti-Federalist
UHIUDLQ QDPHO\ WKDW WKH 9LUJLQLD 3ODQ¶V DSSURDFK ZRXOG WRR HDVLO\ SHUPLW WKH QDWLRQDO
government to swallow up the states. As Mason stated at the Convention:
[W]hatever power may be necesary [sic] for the Natl. Govt. a certain portion must
necessarily be left in the States. . . . The State Legislatures also ought to have some means
of defending themselves agst. encroachments of the Natl. Govt. In every other department
we have studiously endeavored to provide for its self-defence. Shall we leave the States
alone unprovided with the means for this purpose? And what better means can we provide
than the giving them some share in, or rather to make them a constituent part of, the Natl.
Establishment.44

A second concern for those in this camp, beyond the danger of federal overreach,
was that the states would fail to check the federal government in any meaningful way if
they were excluded from federal lawmaking procedures. Quoting Dickinson himself:
The preservation of the States in a certain degree of agency is indispensable. It will
produce the collision between different authorities which should be wished for in order to
check each other. . . . 7KH>9LUJLQLD3ODQ¶V@UHIRUPZRXOGRQO\XQLWHWKHVPDOOVWUHDPV
42. Zuckert, supra note 27, at 64.
43. Zuckert, supra note 25, at 199.
44. 1 FARRAND, supra note 30, at 155.
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into one great current pursuing the same coursHZLWKRXWDQ\RSSRVLWLRQZKDWHYHU´45

For Dickinson Federalists, the primary means for accomplishing this state defense
and federal check was to grant each state equal voting power in the Senate and task state
legislatures with electing federal senators. This strategy, famously manifested in the
Connecticut Compromise, is often attributed to Roger Sherman.46 But Sherman was not
alone, even in Connecticut, in pushing for this plan. The other two Connecticut
delegates, William Samuel Johnson and eventual Judiciary Act architect Oliver
Ellsworth also vociferously backed the compromise. And, in fact, throughout the course
of the Convention, it was Ellsworth instead of Sherman who eventually assumed the role
RIWKH&RQQHFWLFXW&RPSURPLVH¶V³SULQFLSDOVSRNHVSHUVRQ´47 regularly going toe-to-toe
with Madison,48 Hamilton,49 and Wilson50 in floor debates about the plan.
0XFKFRXOGEHDGGHGKHUHDERXW(OOVZRUWK¶VUROHDWWKH&RQYHQWLRQWKDWLVUHOHYDQW
to his later work on the Judiciary Act. But, for present purposes, suffice it to say that his
conduct evinces not only a commitment to the importance of state agency in the national
government, but also a sympathy toward several arguments eventually made by AntiFederalists. Consider, in this regard, just two of Ellsworth¶V FRUH FRQWULEXWLRQV LQ
Philadelphia.
First, as part of the debate surrounding the Connecticut Compromise, in the days
SULRU WR WKH &RQYHQWLRQ¶V -XO\ nd vote to assign the question to be resolved by a
committee of the delegates, Oliver Ellsworth rose multiple times to challenge various
SUHVHQWDWLRQVRIWKH9LUJLQLD3ODQ¶VFRQFHSWLRQRIIHGHUDOLVP In a June 25th speech, for
example, Ellsworth responded to -DPHV:LOVRQ¶VUHPDUNVLQRSSRVLWLRQWRWKHSURSRVDO
to grant state legislatures the power to elect federal senators. Specifically, Wilson had
FODLPHG WKDW WKH GHOHJDWHV QHHGHG WR ³DEVWUDFW>@ DV PXFK DV SRVVLEOH IURP WKH LGHD RI
6WDWH*RYWV´and²as support for this approach²continued:
The election of the 2d. branch by the Legislatures, will introduce & cherish local interests
& local prejudices. The Genl. Govt. is not an assemblage of States, but of individuals for
certain political purposes²it is not meant for the States, but for the individuals composing
them: the individuals therefore not the States, ought to be represented in it . . . .51

This was a model presentation of Virginia Plan federalism. In reply, Ellsworth
urged, contrary to WilsoQWKDWLWZDVD³QHFHVVLW\>WR@PDLQWDLQ>@WKHH[LVWHQFH DJHQF\
RI WKH 6WDWHV´52 ³:LWKRXW WKHLU FR-operation it would be impossible to support a
5HSXEOLFDQ*RYWRYHUVRJUHDWDQH[WHQWRI&RXQWU\´53 ³7KHRQO\FKDQFHRIVXSSRUWLQJ

45. Id. at 152±53.
46. See BEEMAN, supra note 20, at 150±51.
47. See MICHAEL C. TOTH, FOUNDING FEDERALIST: THE LIFE OF OLIVER ELLSWORTH 57±58 (2011). Toth
suggests that Sherman and Ellsworth formed a special partnership in the effort towards the compromise, with
³Sherman planting the seeds of a possible middle way, and Ellsworth, the seasoned litigator, taking on the role
of persuader in chief.´Id.
48. See, e.g., 1 FARRAND, supra note 30, at 463±65, 468±69, 471±72, 474±77, 485±86, 490±92.
49. Id. at 465±67, 468±69, 472±75, 477.
50. Id. at 405±07, 413±15, 416±17.
51. Id. at 406 (emphasis in original).
52. Id.
53. 1 FARRAND, supra note 30, at 406.
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D *HQO *RYW´ (OOVZRUWK FRQFOXGHG ³O>D\@ LQ HQJUDIWLQJ LW RQ WKDW RI WKH LQGLYLGXDO
6WDWHV´54 A June 29 speech, responding to Madison and others, further illustrates
(OOVZRUWK¶VVXSSRUWIRUVRPHVWDWH-level role in the national government:
[P]roportional representation in the first branch [of Congress] was conformable to the
national principle & would secure the large States agst. the small. An equality of voices [in
the Senate] was conformable to the federal55 principle and was necessary to secure the
Small States agst. the large . . . . [L]arge States . . . would notwithstanding the equality of
votes, have an influence that would maintain their superiority . . . . The power of selfdefense was essential to the small States. Nature had given it to the smallest insect of the
creation.56

2Q WKLV ODWWHU RFFDVLRQ (OOVZRUWK¶V GHIHQVH RI VWDWH DJHQF\ LV JURXQGHG PRVW
directly in protecting small states from large state (as opposed to national)
encroachments. %XW UHJDUGOHVV RI KLV VSHFLILF PRWLYDWLRQ KHUH (OOVZRUWK¶V UHPDUNV
plDLQO\ JLYH VWDWH JRYHUQPHQWV D SULRULW\ QRW IRXQG LQ WKH 9LUJLQLD 3ODQ RU 0DGLVRQ¶V
conception of federalism.
$ VHFRQG FRQWULEXWLRQ WKDW XQGHUVFRUHV (OOVZRUWK¶V VWDWH JRYHUQPHQW V\PSDWKLHV
concerns his support for other mechanisms tethering Congress to the states. One example
RIWKLVLVZKDWELRJUDSKHU0LFKDHO7RWKFDOOV(OOVZRUWK¶V³HOHFWRUDOIHGHUDOLVP´²or his
consistent endorsement of measures allowing the states themselves to determine the
qualifications for candidates and voters. 57 As Toth summarizes:
While other framers favored setting strict national standards for matters such as the
eligibility for voting in congressional elections, Ellsworth supported giving local
constituents wide discretion over the rules that would determine who would participate in
WKHQDWLRQ¶VSROLWLFDOOLIH In the face of pressure by nationalist delegates for the creation of
a centrally regulated political marketplace, Ellsworth advanced a locally regulated one.58

$QRWKHU EULHI EXW WHOOLQJ PDQLIHVWDWLRQ RI (OOVZRUWK¶V SUHIHUHQce for connecting
Congress with the states was his endorsement, along with his Connecticut colleague
Roger Sherman, of a one-year term for members of the House of Representatives.
)ROORZLQJ (OOVZRUWK¶V PRWLRQ IRU WKH FKDQJH DQG 0DGLVRQ¶V VSHHFK LQ RSSRVLWion),
Sherman remarked²in language anticipating one of the most quintessentially AntiFederalist arguments advanced during the ratification debates 59²that
54. Id. at 407.
55. Ellsworth¶s use of ³federal´ here is of course meant in contrast to the use of ³national´ in the previous
sentence, thus highlighting how his plan for equal representation in the Senate would respect state sovereignty.
56. 1 FARRAND, supra note 30, at 468±69.
57. TOTH, supra note 47, at 69±82.
58. Id. at 71.
59. See, e.g., Federal Farmer VII, in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST WRITINGS OF THE MELANCTON SMITH
CIRCLE, supra note 7, at 70 (cautioning that there is a tendency in every society to ³confer on one part [of
society] the height of power and happiness, and to reduce the others to the extreme form of weakness and
misery´); Brutus IV, in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST WRITINGS OF THE MELANCTON SMITH CIRCLE, supra note 7, at
191 (³The great art, therefore, in forming a good constitution, appears to be this, so to frame it, as that those to
whom the power is committed shall be subject to the same feelings, and aim at the same objects as the people
do, who transfer to them their authority´); HERBERT STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR 17
(1981) (noting that the Anti-Federalists generally wanted representatives to be ³directly answerable to and
dependent on their constituents´ by way of ³short terms of office, frequent rotation, and a numerous
representation´).
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[He] preferred annual elections . . . [because] representatives ought to return home and mix
with the people. By remaining at the seat of Govt. they would acquire the habits of the
place which might differ from those of their Constituents.60

One final notable, but more complex, example of this state government sympathy
ZDV (OOVZRUWK¶V SURSRVDO WKDW DOO Pembers of Congress actually be paid by the states
rather than by the national treasury.61 In defense of this proposal as applied to the House
of Representatives, on June 22, Ellsworth pointed to the different norms and standards of
living in different states as a reason for letting each state decide its own salary for its
national representatives.62 And on June 26, in the Senate context, Ellsworth argued that
KDYLQJ WKH VWDWHV SD\ WKH QDWLRQDO VHQDWRUV¶ VDODULHV ZRXOG HQVXUH WKDW WKH QDWLRQDO
JRYHUQPHQW ³KD>G@ WKH FRQILGHQFH RI WKH 6WDWHV´63 By the time this measure was
UHLQWURGXFHGPXFKODWHU0DGLVRQ¶VQRWHVLQGLFDWHWKDW(OOVZRUWKKDGFKDQJHGKLVPLQG
DGPLWWLQJ WKDW WKLV ³PRGH RI SD\PHQW´ ZRXOG UHVXOW LQ ³WRR PXFK GHSHQGHQFH RQ WKH
VWDWHV´64 But EllswoUWK¶V LQLWLDO VXSSRUW IRU WKLV DSSURDFK IXUWKHU GHPRQVWUDWHV KLV
localist leanings.
To return to the thread with which this section began, by the end of July, not only
KDGWKH&RQYHQWLRQUHMHFWHG0DGLVRQ¶VPXOWLSOHSURSRVDOVIRUJUDQWLQJ&RQJUHVVDJHQF\
into state decision-making, in fact, through the Connecticut Compromise and related
developments, the national legislative branch had become the home for state agency in
federal decision-making. This reversal of fortunes goes a long way towards explaining
0DGLVRQ¶V IUXVWUDWLRQV QRWHG DERYH But it also brings us to an important point in the
HYROXWLRQRIWKH&RQYHQWLRQ¶VFRQFHSWLRQRIWKHMXGLFLDU\
'HVSLWHWKHXOWLPDWHIDLOXUHRI0DGLVRQ¶VIHGHUDOQHJDWLYHKLVDUJXPHQWVDSSHDUWR
have convinced the delegates that it was necessary to have some device to protect against
state abuses. Having closed the door on legislative solutions for protecting the federal
government against state encroachment, the delegates turned to the judiciary.65
Critically, the delegates decided that using the judiciary to prevent state overreach would
strike the right balance between the two layers of government and would be most
palatable to the states. 7KXVRQWKHVDPHGD\WKHGHOHJDWHVGLVFDUGHG0DGLVRQ¶VQHJDWLYH
for the final time, discussion turned to what would eventually become the Supremacy
Clause.66 And within four days of finalizing the language of the Supremacy Clause, the
Convention revised the language of Article III, adding²among other things²the ability
of fHGHUDO FRXUWV WR KHDU FODLPV DULVLQJ ³XQGHU WKLV &RQVWLWXWLRQ´67 If something like

60. 1 FARRAND, supra note 30, at 362; see also id. at 365 (Yates¶ notes of Sherman¶s speech).
61. Id. at 371±72, 74 (with regard to the House of Representatives), 427 (with regard to the Senate).
62. Id. at 371. Here, in response to (especially Hamilton¶s) criticism of this proposal, Ellsworth also makes
the more pragmatic point that this arrangement would increase the chances of the Constitution¶s ratification by
the states. Id. at 374, 379 (³If I return to my state and tell them, we made such and such regulations for a
general government, because we dared not trust you with any extensive powers, will they . . . adopt your
government?´).
63. Id. at 427.
64. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 290 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter 2
FARRAND].
65. LACROIX, supra note 25, at 161; see also Zuckert, supra note 27, at 57, 64±69.
66. See LACROIX, supra note 25, at 161±62.
67. Id. at 163±64.
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'LFNLQVRQ )HGHUDOLVP ZRQ RXW LQ WKH OHJLVODWLYH EUDQFK 0DGLVRQ¶V FRQFHSWLRQ RI
federalism had found a new, albeit unexpected, home in the federal judiciary.
Yet there is one key caveat to this characterization. Despite establishing (even if
XQZLWWLQJO\ WKHSRZHURIMXGLFLDOUHYLHZWKH³0DGLVRQLDQ&RPSURPLVH´FRQFHUQLQJWKH
creation of inferior federal courts famously left a blank space where most of the details
of the judiciary might have been included. Thus, considering that the judiciary now
ZLHOGHGWKHNH\ DQGFRQWURYHUVLDO LQJUHGLHQWRI0DGLVRQ¶VIHGHUDOLVPLWLVQRZRQGHU
that this issue was fated to become a flashpoint in the upcoming ratification debates. In
short, even if Hart and Wechsler were correct to suggest that the federal judiciary was
LQLWLDOO\D³VHFRQGDU\RUHYHQWHUWLDU\FRQFHUQ´WKLVVHQWLPHQWZRXOGVRRQFKDQJH
II.

THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS¶ CRITICISMS OF ARTICLE III

Richard Henry Lee, a sitting Continental Congressman from Virginia who had
previously served as President of the Continental Congress, was among the prominent
figures that were notably absent from the Convention. Despite his absence, Lee freely
offered his advice to Virginia delegates such as George Mason before the Convention,
DQGWRWKHH[WHQWSRVVLEOHIROORZHGWKH&RQYHQWLRQ¶VSURFHHGLQJVIURPDIDU 68
Lee took special note of the fact that the order originally authorizing the
Convention to revise the Articles of Confederation required that any proposal obtain
congressional approval before being forwarded on to the states. 69 Thus, after the
&RQYHQWLRQ¶VSURSRVHG&RQVWLWXWLRQZDVUHOHDVHG/HHVSHQWVHYHUDOGD\VSRULQJRYHUWKH
draft, and when the measure finally came before Congress, he surprised many by
offering a number of amendments.70
For this effort, Lee was politically pilloried. His motion to consider amendments²
including, most notably, a Bill of Rights²was rejected without debate.71 Matters further
deteriorated after Lee, along with future Anti-Federalist apologist Melancton Smith,
DVNHGWKHERG\WRH[SUHVVLWVGLVDSSURYDORIWKHSURSRVHG&RQVWLWXWLRQ¶VUHTXLUHPHQWWKDW
only nine states ratify the document instead of the unanimity required under the Articles
of Confederation.72 This move was also swiftly rejected.
Following this episode, and before returning from New York to Virginia, Lee met
with Melancton Smith and John Lamb.73 This meeting, where these men likely discussed
their strategy for securing amendments to the proposed Constitution, portended a
growing movement of Americans who were skeptical of the plan. Later, in December
1787, Lee would publish a lengthy letter outlining his opposition to the Constitution,74
only to receive further public (and personal) criticism from Federalists like Oliver

68. J. KENT MCGAUGHY, RICHARD HENRY LEE OF VIRGINIA: A PORTRAIT OF AN AMERICAN
REVOLUTIONARY 147±58 (2004).
69. Id. at 191.
70. See 1 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 337±39 (John P.
Kaminski et al. eds., 1978) [hereinafter 1 DHRC].
71. MCGAUGHY, supra note 68, at 191.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. 8 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 61±64, 208 (John P.
Kaminski et al. eds., 1978) [hereinafter 8 DHRC].
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Ellsworth. Melancton Smith would also soon take up the Anti-Federalist cause in New
York, helping author at least one (and perhaps both) of what were arguably the most
sophisticated Anti-Federalist tracts written during the ratification period: Brutus and
Federal Farmer.75
The Anti-)HGHUDOLVWV¶ DUJXPHQWV DJDLQVW WKH &RQVWLWXWLRQ ZHUH PDQ\ EXW RQH
quintessential and foundational Anti-Federalist objection is worth underscoring at the
outset. $V SUHVDJHG E\ *HRUJH 0DVRQ¶V VWDWement quoted above, the Anti-Federalists
especially feared that the Constitution was calculated to absorb the states into a single
national government. As Federal Farmer I²published October 8, 1787²told the tale:
the men who had originally pressed for the &RQVWLWXWLRQDO&RQYHQWLRQNQHZWKDW³>W@KH
idea of destroying . . . the state government[s], and forming one consolidated system,
FRXOGQRW>EHRSHQO\@DGPLWWHG´76 Thus, these men had attempted to fool the states into
³SDVVLQJ WKH 5XELFRQ´ WRZDUG D VLQJOH XQLILHG JRYHUQPHQW E\ WDNLQJ RQO\ ³WKH ILUVW
LPSRUWDQW VWHS´ LQ WKLV GLUHFWLRQ77 7KH XOWLPDWH JRDO DQG WKH SURSRVHG V\VWHP¶V
XQDYRLGDEOHWHQGHQF\KRZHYHUZDV³WRFKDQJHLQWLPHRXUFRQGLWLRQ . . [from] being
thirteen republics, under a federal head . . >WR@RQHFRQVROLGDWHGJRYHUQPHQW´78 %UXWXV¶
RSHQLQJOHWWHUSXWWKHSRLQWVLPLODUO\VD\LQJWKDW³DOWKRXJKWKHJRYHUQPHQWUHSRUWHGE\
the convention does not go to a perfect and entire consolidation . . . it approaches so near
to it, thaWLWPXVWLIH[HFXWHGFHUWDLQO\DQGLQIDOOLEO\WHUPLQDWHLQLW´79 Numerous other
Anti-Federalists raised similar concerns.80
3UHYHQWLQJ³FRQVROLGDWLRQ´WKHQEHFDPHDVORJDQRIVRUWVIRUWKH$QWL-Federalists
that carried well into the state ratifying conventions and beyond. In this way, the AntiFederalists plainly shared some common ground with the so-called Dickinson Federalists
at the Constitutional Convention like Mason and Ellsworth.
On that note, it should not surprise the reader to learn that ElOVZRUWK¶V RZQ
contributions to the ratification debates include multiple statements demonstrating his
GHVLUHWRSURWHFWWKHVWDWHV¶VSKHUHRILQIOXHQFHLQFOXGLQJ  KLVDVVXUDQFHLQDSXEOLF
report (jointly authored by Sherman) that, under the new plan, WKH³VWDWHV>ZRXOG@UHWDLQ
WKHLU 6RYHUHLJQW\ LQ DOO >ORFDO@ PDWWHUV´81 (2) his suggestion in the pseudonymously
75. See THE ANTI-FEDERALIST WRITINGS OF THE MELANCTON SMITH CIRCLE, supra note 7, at xi±xxxii
(discussing the authorship of Brutus and Federal Farmer).
76. Federal Farmer I, in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST WRITINGS OF THE MELANCTON SMITH CIRCLE, supra note
7, at 23.
77. Id. at 19, 23.
78. Id. at 22.
79. Brutus I, in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST WRITINGS OF THE MELANCTON SMITH CIRCLE, supra note 7, at 169.
80. See, e.g., Cato III (Sept. 26, 1787), in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 109±13 (Herbert J. Storing
& Murray Dry eds., 1981) (arguing that a consolidated government would run afoul of Montesquieu¶s
admonition against large republics); Centinel II (Oct. 24, 1787), in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 147
(Herbert J. Storing & Murray Dry eds., 1981) (predicting that Congress would ³before long swallow up the
Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial powers of the several States´); The Address and Reasons of the
Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania To Their Constituents (Dec. 18, 1787), in 3 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 155 (Herbert J. Storing & Murray Dry eds., 1981) (noting that ³two co-ordinate
sovereignties would be a solecism in politics´ and that the inevitable conflict between state and national
governments will result in the ³absolute destruction of state governments . . . [because they] are divested of
every means of defence´).
81. 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 352 (John P. Kaminski et
al. eds., 1978) [hereinafter 3 DHRC].
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published Landholder IV that there was no need to fear consolidation²or really any
change to the situation of the states²because their power to choose Senators
³LQGLVVROXEO\OLQNHG´WKHIHGHUDODQGVWDWHJRYHUQPHQWV 82 and (3) his passing suggestion
in Landholder VI that, except where the United States Supreme Court had original
MXULVGLFWLRQPDWWHUVPLJKW³LQWKHILUVWLQVWDQFHEH>KHDUG@LQWKe state courts and those
WULDOV EH ILQDO H[FHSW LQ FDVHV RI JUHDW PDJQLWXGH´83 Because the immediate question
facing the nation had become whether to ratify the Constitution as proposed, however,
Ellsworth also frequently took up the mantle of defending a robust and unified national
government.84 Thus, despite the affinities between Anti-Federalists and pro-state power
Federalists, this natural alliance would sit largely unrealized for the time being.
Turning to the specific criticisms of Article III put forward by Anti-Federalists,
many publications in the latter months of 1787 contained some analysis of the judiciary.
5LFKDUG+HQU\/HH¶VSURSRVHGDPHQGPHQWVWRWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQIRUH[DPSOHVRXJKWWKH
guarantee of a jury trial in civil cases, a provision to ensure that juries in criminal cases
ZRXOGEHIRUPHGIURPFLWL]HQVOLYLQJLQWKH³YLFLQDJH´ZKHUHWKHDFWLRQDURVHRUZKHUH
the defendant was domiciled, and certain limitations on diversity and alienage
jurisdiction so as to prevent defendants from being hauled into a court hundreds of miles
away from home.85 Other Anti-Federalists struck similar chords. Cincinnatus II, for
example, on November 8, 1787, defended the necessity of the trial by jury in civil cases
and expressed concern that federal appellate jurisdiction over questions of both law and
fact would subvert jury trials completely. 86 ,Q *HRUJH 0DVRQ¶V Objections to the
Constitution, published in various places in November 1787, he suggested that the
federal judiciary might be responsible for bringing about the feared consolidation, which
would in turn encourage the oppression of the poor:
The judiciary of the United States is so constructed and extended as to absorb and destroy
the judiciaries of the several states; thereby rendering laws as tedious, intricate, and
expensive, and justice as unattainable, by a great part of the community, as in England; and
enabling the rich to oppress and ruin the poor.87

Also, there were numerous other Anti-Federalist publications in this time period
containing partially developed criticisms of Article III, including Centinel II (published
October 24, 1787),88 The Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania
(published December 16, 1787),89 and Federal Farmer XV (published January 16,

82. Id. at 479±80 (claiming that ³no alteration in the state governments is even proposed, but they are to
remain identically the same as they now are´).
83. Id. at 490.
84. See, e.g., Landholder II, in 3 DHRC, supra note 81, at 463 (noting that ³[a] government capable of
controlling the whole . . . is one of the prerequisites for national liberty´); Ellsworth speech at Connecticut
Convention (Jan. 7, 1788), in 3 DHRC, supra note 81, at 548±54 (emphasizing the necessity of judicial review
to keep ³the states [from] go[ing] beyond their limits´).
85. 1 DHRC, supra note 70, at 337±39.
86. Cincinnatus II (Nov. 8, 1787), in 6 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 11±12 (Herbert J. Storing &
Murray Dry eds., 1981).
87. 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 9±13 (John P. Kaminski
et al. eds., 1978) [hereinafter 2 DHRC].
88. Id. at 147±49.
89. 3 DHRC, supra note 81, at 159±61.
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1788).90
Beginning in late-January 1788, however, the upward trajectory of Anti-Federalist
commentary about the federal judiciary reached its zenith in a series of essays penned by
Brutus. Instead of devoting only a few scattered comments to the topic as did most other
Anti-Federalist authors, Brutus set aside five consecutive letters presenting a
FRPSUHKHQVLYH DQG IRUFHIXO FULWLTXH RI WKH SURSRVHG &RQVWLWXWLRQ¶V QDWLRQDO MXGLFLDU\
From the outset, Brutus was not shy about his unique ambition in these letters,
suggestLQJ WKDW XS WR WKDW SRLQW QR ZULWHU RQ HLWKHU VLGH ³KD>G@ >\HW@ GLVFXVVHG WKH
MXGLFLDOSRZHUVZLWKDQ\GHJUHHRIDFFXUDF\´91
7KH RYHUDUFKLQJ WKHPH RI %UXWXV¶ DQDO\VLV RI $UWLFOH ,,, LV WKDW WKH SURSRVHG
Constitution grants the federal judiciary far too long a leash, and that the Supreme
&RXUW¶V XQLTXH GHJUHH RI LQIOXHQFH ZLOO EH XVHG WR EULQJ DERXW WKH GHVWUXFWLRQ RU
³FRQVROLGDWLRQ´ RIVWDWHJRYHUQPHQWV Brutus XI, the first letter examining the judiciary,
provides a concise opening formulation of this claim, stating that²through these
letters²%UXWXVZLOOVKRZKRZ$UWLFOH,,,³ZLOORSHUDWHWRDWRWDOVXEYHUVLRQRIWKHVWDWH
MXGLFLDULHVLIQRWWRWKHOHJLVODWLYHDXWKRULW\RIWKHVWDWHV´ 92 In this opening letter, Brutus
also provides a roadmap of his argument. First, he plans to convince his readers of the
WUXO\ XQSUHFHGHQWHG ³QDWXUH DQG H[WHQW RI WKH MXGLFLDO SRZHUV´ JUDQWHG XQGHU WKH
proposed Constitution.93 And, second, Brutus hopes to show how this power will be
inevitably abused at the expense of the states.94
$V WR WKH ILUVW SRLQW %UXWXV¶ SUHVHQWDWLRQ RI IHGHUDO MXGLFLDO SRZHU EHJLQV E\
HPSKDVL]LQJ WKH QDWLRQDO MXGLFLDO EUDQFK¶V UHPDUNDEOH LQGHSHQGHQFH Federal judges,
%UXWXVVWUHVVHVDUH³WRWDOO\LQGHSHQGHQWERWKRIWKHSHRSOHDQGWhe legislature, both with
UHVSHFW WR WKHLU RIILFHV DQG VDODULHV´95 What is more, beyond their tenure and salary
protections, Brutus notes how these judges might resist any external oversight through
their power to flexibly interpret the Constitution. In one striking passage, Brutus states
WKDWWKHFRXUWV³ZLOOJLYHWKHVHQVHRIHYHU\DUWLFOHRIWKHFRQVWLWXWLRQWKDWPD\IURPWLPH
WR WLPH FRPH EHIRUH WKHP´ DQG WKDW WKH\ ³ZLOO QRW FRQILQH WKHPVHOYHV WR DQ\ IL[HG RU
established rules, but will determine, according to what appears to them, the reason and
VSLULW RI WKH FRQVWLWXWLRQ´96 /DWHU %UXWXV FODLPV WKDW WKH ZRUG ³HTXLW\´ LQ $UWLFOH ,,,
VHFWLRQZLOOSHUPLWMXGJHVWRFRQVLGHUWKHSUHDPEOHLQWKHSURFHVVRI³JLY>LQJ@VXFKD
meaning to the various parts [of the Constitution], as will . . . most effectually promote
the ends the constitution had in view . . . ´97 Still later, Brutus argues that other parts of

90. 2 DHRC, supra note 87, at 315±23.
91. See Brutus XI, in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST WRITINGS OF THE MELANCTON SMITH CIRCLE, supra note 7,
at 233.
92. Id. at 235.
93. Id. at 234.
94. Id. at 234, 237±39.
95. Id. at 234.
96. Brutus XI, in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST WRITINGS OF THE MELANCTON SMITH CIRCLE, supra note 7, at
236.
97. Id. at 238. Brutus earlier places this ³ends-based´ method of equitable interpretation in the context of a
broader theory of constitutional interpretation. ³[C]ourts are to give such meaning to the constitution as
comports best with the common, and generally received acceptation of the words in which it is expressed,
regarding their ordinary and popular use, rather than their grammatical propriety,´ Brutus states. He continues:
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the Constitution invite this open-HQGHG DSSURDFK EHFDXVH WKH\ DUH SKUDVHG LQ ³JHQHUDO
and indefinite terms, which are either equivocal, ambiguous, or which require long
GHILQLWLRQVWRXQIROGWKHH[WHQWRIWKHLUPHDQLQJ´98
All of this is especially problematic, Brutus continues, because the Supreme Court
will have the final say as to the meaning of the Constitution. Anticipating Chief Justice
0DUVKDOO¶VDUJXPHQWLQMarbury v. Madison,99 Brutus contends that, because Article III,
section 2 explicitly extends the judicial power to FDVHV³DULVLQJXQGHUWKLVFRQVWLWXWLRQ´
and WRWKRVHDULVLQJ³XQGHUWKHODZVRIWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV´WKLVSODLQO\VXJJHVWVWKDWWKH
6XSUHPH&RXUWKDVWKH³SRZHUWRUHVROYHDOOTXHVWLRQVWKDWPD\DULVHRQDQ\FDVHRQWKH
construction of the constitution . . . ´100 0RUHRYHUEHFDXVH³WKHUHLVQRSRZHUSURYLGHG
in the constitution, WKDW FDQ FRUUHFW >WKH 6XSUHPH &RXUW¶V@ HUURUV RU FRQWURXO WKHLU
DGMXGLFDWLRQV´ WKHLU RSLQLRQV ³ZKDWHYHU WKH\ PD\ EH ZLOO KDYH WKH IRUFH RI ODZ
. . . ´101 Nor can Congress be permitted to disagree with the federal judiciary, Brutus
FODLPV³7KHOHJLVODture must be controuled by the constitution, and not the constitution
E\WKHP´102
Expanding on this point in Brutus XV, the final letter on the judiciary, Brutus notes
how even the people themselves are unable to check the Supreme Court under the
proposed Constitution:
Had the construction of the constitution been left with the legislature, they would have
explained it at their peril; if they exceed their powers, or sought to find in the constitution,
more than was expressed in the letter, the people from whom they derived their power
could remove them, and do themselves right . . . . [B]ut when this power is lodged in the
hands of men independent of the people . . . no way is left to controul them but with a high
hand and an outstretched arm.103

Here, Brutus implies that a significant flaw exists in the mixed brand of federalism
adopted by the Constitutional Convention. 8QOLNH0DGLVRQ¶V&RQJUHVVLRQDOQHJDWLYHWKH
&RQYHQWLRQ¶V MXGLFLDO VROXWLRQ IRU SURWHFWLQJ WKH IHGHUDO JRYHUQPHQW IURP VWDWH
encroachmeQW LQVXODWHV FDUH RYHU WKH QDWLRQ¶V IXQGDPHQWDO FRQWUDFW IURP WKH SHRSOH
themselves! Thus, the very motivating principle of the Virginia Plan²that military
conflicts between state and federal governments must be avoided at all costs²is again
put at risk. If the people cannot realistically expect to hold their governors accountable
³[w]here words are dubious, they will be explained by context . . . [and] [t]he end of the clause will be attended
to, and the words will be understood as to bear no meaning or a very absurd one.´Id. at 235±36.
98. Id. at 237.
99. There, Chief Justice Marshall states:
The judicial power of the United States is extended to all cases arising under the Constitution. Could
it be the intention of those who gave this power to say that, in using it, the Constitution should not
be looked into? That a case arising under the Constitution should be decided without examining the
instrument under which it arises? This is too extravagant to be maintained.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 178±79 (1803).
100. Brutus XI, in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST WRITINGS OF THE MELANCTON SMITH CIRCLE, supra note 7, at
235.
101. Id. at 236
102. Id. at 236±37.
103. Id. at 262. Brutus¶ use of the phrase ³a high hand and an outstretched arm´ is a reference to the Old
Testament God¶s characterization of his deliverance of the Israelites from Egypt. See, e.g., Deuteronomy 4:34,
5:15, 7:19, 11:2.
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for what the people judge to be flawed interpretations of the Constitution, they will have
no choice but to turn back to military solutions to address their grievances. This line of
thought is also likely behind an earlier passage in Brutus XV, which echoes the Lockean
FKDUDFWHUL]DWLRQRIUHYROXWLRQDVDQ³DSSHDOWRKHDYHQ´104
There is no power above [the judiciary], to controul any of their decisions. There is no
authority that can remove them, and they cannot be controuled by the laws of the
legislature. In short, they are independent of the people, of the legislature, and of every
power under heaven. Men placed in this situation will generally soon feel themselves
independent of heaven itself.105

7KLVEULQJVXVWRWKHVHFRQGSRLQWRQ%UXWXV¶LQLWLDORXWOLQH Having established the
unique power and position of the federal courts, Brutus turns again to the theme of
consolidation, offering numerous reasons in Brutus XI and XII ZK\WKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶V
expansive power spells doom for the states. 6HYHUDO RI %UXWXV¶ DUJXPHQWV VHL]H RQ
specific clauses of the Constitution²such as the Necessary and Proper Clause, the
SUHDPEOH¶V DGPRQLWLRQV WRZDUG IRUPLQJ ³D PRUH SHUIHFW 8QLRQ´ DQG ³HVWDEOLVK>LQJ@
-XVWLFH´DQG$UWLFOH,9¶V3ULYLOHJHVDQG,PPXQLWLHV&ODXVH²by way of contending that
all of these will eventually be marshaled against the states. 106 %XW WKH FRUH RI %UXWXV¶
argument on this point concerns his analysis of the human desire for power.
,WLVD[LRPDWLF WKDWPHQKROGLQJSROLWLFDORIILFH DUH³WHQDFLRXVRISRZHU´ %UXWXV
claims.107 Accordingly, unless they are somehow checked, such men will only expand
their own influence. 7KLV ³PD[LP´ RI SROLWLFDO SRZHU LV HVSHFLDOO\ SURQRXQFed in the
MXGLFLDO FRQWH[W %UXWXV VXJJHVWV EHFDXVH ³WKH GLJQLW\ DQG LPSRUWDQFH RI >IHGHUDO@
judges, will be in proportion to the extent and magnitude of the powers they
H[HUFLVH´108 )HGHUDO MXGJHV ZLOO WKXV EH LQFHQWLYL]HG WR ³JLYH VXFK D PHDQLQJ WR WKH
constitution in all cases where it can possibly be done, as will enlarge the sphere of their
RZQDXWKRULW\´DWWKHH[SHQVHRIWKHVWDWHV 109 As a result, even if this development is
gradual, bit-by-ELWWKHIHGHUDOFRXUWVZLOOHURGHVWDWHSRZHU³XQWLO>WKHstates] become so
WULIOLQJDQGXQLPSRUWDQWDVQRWWREHZRUWKKDYLQJ´110
$IWHU %UXWXV¶ WUHDWPHQW RI µFRQVROLGDWLRQ¶ LQ OHWWHUV XI and XII and before he
returns to the topic of judicial power in Brutus XV, in letters XIII and XIV Brutus focuses
on two other important aspects of Article III: state sovereign immunity and the right to
trial by jury. &RQFHUQLQJ WKH ILUVW %UXWXV DUJXHV WKDW SHUPLWWLQJ VXLWV ³EHWZHHQ D VWDWH
DQGFLWL]HQVRIDQRWKHUVWDWH>LV@LPSURSHU´DQGWKDWWKLV³ZLOOLQLWVH[HUFLVHSURYe most
SHUQLFLRXVDQGGHVWUXFWLYH´111 )RURQHVXFKVXLWVDUH³KXPLOLDWLQJDQGGHJUDGLQJWRD
104. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 379±80 (Peter Laslett ed., 1960).
105. Brutus XI, in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST WRITINGS OF THE MELANCTON SMITH CIRCLE, supra note 7, at
258.
106. Id. at 241±45.
107. Id. at 238.
108. Id.
109. Id. Brutus also argues that if the Constitution is to be interpreted in accordance with its ends and spirit,
³its spirit is to subvert and abolish all the powers of the state government, and to embrace every object to which
any government extends.´Id. at 243.
110. Brutus XI, in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST WRITINGS OF THE MELANCTON SMITH CIRCLE, supra note 7, at
245.
111. Id. at 247.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons,

19

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 56 [], Iss. 1, Art. 4

TULSA LAW REVIEW

20

[Vol. 56:1

JRYHUQPHQW´112 Also, given that many states owed money to individuals after the
5HYROXWLRQDU\ :DU LQ %UXWXV¶ PLQG WKLV SURYLVLRQ FRXOG SHUPLW VXFK ZLGHVSUHDG
litigation against states that the solvency of state budgets would be jeopardized.113
Concerning the right to trial by jury, in letter XIV Brutus sounds a common Anti)HGHUDOLVWUHIUDLQXQGHUVFRULQJWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIWKHULJKWWRDMXU\IURPRQH¶VYLFLQDJH
in all cases²both criminal and civil. Yet, unlike most Anti-Federalists touching on the
LVVXH %UXWXV¶ FRPPHQWV GR QRW DULVH LQ WKH FRQWH[W RI DUJXLQJ IRU D ELOO RI ULJKWV EXW
XQGHU $UWLFOH ,,, VHFWLRQ  FODXVH  ZKLFK JLYHV WKH 6XSUHPH &RXUW ³DSSHOODWH
jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations as
WKH&RQJUHVVVKDOOPDNH´114
+HUH%UXWXV¶EDVLFFODLPLVWKDWDSSHOODWHMXULVGLFWLRQRYHUTXHVWLRQVRIfact would
undermine the entire institution of the jury. If an appellate judge can reject a lower court
MXU\¶VIDFWXDOILQGLQJVRXWRIKDQG%UXWXVHPSKDVL]HVWKHULJKWWRDMXU\LVSUDFWLFDOO\
hollow. Alternatively, if Congress were to require that appellate courts call a second jury
when reviewing lower court findings of fact, this would significantly incentivize
appeals²WKXVPDNLQJ³WKHLQIHULRUFRXUWV . DOPRVWHQWLUHO\XVHOHVV´115 Under such a
system, litigants would have to pay an attorney throughout the duration of yet another
WULDODQGDV%UXWXVDSWO\QRWHV³WKHFRVWVDFFUXLQJLQFRXUWVJHQHUDOO\DGYDQFHZLWKWKH
JUDGH RI WKH FRXUW´116 Litigants would have to meet new evidence if introduced and
would be held under the shadow of litigation for a longer period of time.117 Finally,
Brutus observes that appellate courts will almost always be located further away from the
homes of the witnesses and parties involved than trial courts. 118 And this will inevitably
still be the case (although to a lesser degree), even if Congress requires appellate judges
to ride circuit.119 Thus, because fewer witnesses will be able to make the trip to the
appellate court, the second jury runs the risk of being deprived of the benefits of live
testimony and cross-examination. He states:
It is of great importance in the distribution of justice that witnesses should be examined
face to face, that the parties should have the fairest opportunity of cross examining them in
order to bring out the whole truth; there is something in the manner in which a witness
delivers his testimony which cannot be committed to paper, and which yet very frequently
gives a complexion to his evidence, very different from what it would bear if committed to

112. Id.
113. Id. at 247±49.
114. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis mine).
115. See THE ANTI-FEDERALIST WRITINGS OF THE MELANCTON SMITH CIRCLE, supra note 7, at 253. It is
worth noting here, however, that many state judicial systems at the time would have permitted something like a
second trial upon appeal. See GOEBEL, supra note 6, at 27±29 (discussing how some of the American colonies,
and especially those in New England, essentially permitted a new trial on appeal throughout much of the 18th
Century); RITZ, supra note 11, at 6, 27 (discussing how appeals involving a new trial and jury were not unusual
in post-revolutionary state judicial systems).
116. THE ANTI-FEDERALIST WRITINGS OF THE MELANCTON SMITH CIRCLE, supra note 7, at 254 (opining
that ³the costs in the supreme general court will exceed [every] court[]; the officers . . . will be more dignified
. . . , the lawyers of the most ability will practice in them, and the trouble and expense of attending them will be
greater´).
117. Id. at 251.
118. Id. at 253.
119. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol56/iss1/4

20

Moore: Trimming the Least Dangerous Branch: The Anti-Federalists and the

2020]

TRIMMING THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH

21

writing . . . .120

Adding all of this together, BrXWXV DUJXHV WKLV ZLOO FDXVH WKH ³DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ RI
MXVWLFHXQGHUWKHSRZHUVRIWKHMXGLFLDO´WREHIXQGDPHQWDOO\RSSUHVVLYH 121 The fact that
WKHFRXUWV³ZLOOEHDWWHQGHGZLWKVXFKDKHDY\H[SHQVH´DFFRUGLQJWR%UXWXV³DPRXQW>V@
to little short of a denial of justice to the poor and midling class of people who in every
JRYHUQPHQW VWDQG PRVW LQ QHHG RI WKH SURWHFWLRQ RI WKH ODZ´ 122 ³1R PDQ RI PLGOLQJ
IRUWXQHFDQVXVWDLQWKHH[SHQFHRIVXFKDODZVXLW´%UXWXVH[FODLPV³DQGWKHUHIRUHWKH
poorer and midling class of citizens will be under necessity of submitting to the demands
of the rich and the lordly, in cases that will come under the cognizance of this FRXUW´123
What solution does Brutus offer for these problems? His answer here is
particularly important, for it helps clarify the Dickinson-like brand of federalism he
supports. Beyond arguing that federal appellate courts should be permitted to review
RQO\TXHVWLRQVRIODZ%UXWXVVXJJHVWVWKDW³WKHFRXUWVRIWKHUHVSHFWLYHVWDWHVPLJht . . .
KDYHEHHQVHFXUHO\WUXVWHG´ZLWKGHFLGLQJDOOFDVHVLQLWLDOO\ 124 By allowing state courts
WRWU\DOOFDVHV³LQWKHILUVWLQVWDQFH´%UXWXVFODLPV³>W@KLVPHWKRGZRXOGSUHVHUYHWKH
good old way of administering justice, would bring justice to ever\ PDQ¶V GRRU DQG
SUHVHUYHWKHLQHVWLPDEOHULJKWRIWULDOE\MXU\´125 Further, this approach would avoid, as
much as possible, the consolidating tendency that follows from giving federal judges
authority to interpret both federal and state law. 126 Note, however, that Brutus does not
assert that state courts should decide all questions with finality, only that they should get
the first crack. ³7KHVWDWHFRXUWVZRXOGEHXQGHUVXIILFLHQWFRQWURXO´%UXWXVVXJJHVWV³LI
writs of error were allowed from the state courts to the supreme court of the union . . . on
all cases in which the laws of the union are concerned, and perhaps to all cases in which
D IRUHLJQHU LV D SDUW\´127 8QGHU %UXWXV¶ SURSRVHG V\VWHP WKHQ WKHUH ZRXOG EH QR
federal inferior courts, but the United States Supreme Court would have ample authority
to review any questions of federal law that arose in cases at the state level.
Almost in the same breath that he proposes this solution, however, Brutus seems to
grant that the ship of federal inferior courts may have already set sail. ³>$@VWKHV\VWHP
QRZVWDQGV´%UXWXVFRQFHGHV³WKHUHLVWREHDVPDQ\LQIHULRUFRXUWVDV&RQJUHss may
seem fit to appoint . . . .´128 And if Congress has the power to create inferior courts, it is
safe to assume that this power will be exercised. ,QWKLVZD\%UXWXV¶ILQDOSRVLWLRQRQ
inferior courts is not that far from that of other Anti-Federalists²like Federal Farmer²
who took it as a given that the proposed national government would include inferior

120. Id. at 254.
121. THE ANTI-FEDERALIST WRITINGS OF THE MELANCTON SMITH CIRCLE, supra note 7, at 254.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 253.
124. Id. at 256.
125. Id.
126. THE ANTI-FEDERALIST WRITINGS OF THE MELANCTON SMITH CIRCLE, supra note 7, at 245 (³It is
obvious that these courts will have authority to decide upon the validity of the laws of any of the states, in all
cases that come before them . . . . [Thus,] it is easy to see that in proportion as the general government acquires
power and jurisdiction [the states will] lose [their] rights . . . ´).
127. Id. at 256
128. Id.
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courts but presumably hoped to limit WKRVHFRXUWV¶ power and jurisdiction.129
6RIRUFHIXOZDV%UXWXV¶WUHDWPHQWRI$UWLFOH,,,WKDWLWFDXJKWWKHDWWHQWLRQRI1HZ
<RUN )HGHUDOLVWV VXFK DV $OH[DQGHU +DPLOWRQ ZKR UHVSRQGHG DV ³3XEOLXV´  LQ
Federalist Nos. 78–83. In that regard, it is worth highlighting that Brutus XI through
Brutus XV were published between January 31, 1788 and March 20, 1788.130 Federalist
Nos. 74–83, on the other hand, appeared in book form more than two months later on
May 28, 1788.131 Also, this collection was issued almost two months after Federalist
No. 73 (published April 2, 1788), a break that was by far the longest between any two
editions of the Federalist Papers.132 And this all occurred against the backdrop of New
<RUN¶VUDWLILFDWLRQHOHFWLRQZKLFh took place in late April 1788, and the state ratifying
convention which began in June 1788. This suggests, at the very least, that the
)HGHUDOLVWVEHOLHYHG%UXWXV¶DUJXPHQWVGHVHUYHGDFDUHIXOUHVSRQVH
III. THE FEDERALISTS¶ REJOINDER AND THE STATE RATIFYING CONVENTIONS
Federalist No. 78 arguably occupies a position behind only Federalist Nos. 10 and
51 among the most widely read of the Federalist Papers. Yet despite its theoretical
power and historical importance, this letter, and the related installments that follow, are
rarely considered in relation to Brutus.133 This is unfortunate because an appreciation of
+DPLOWRQ¶V SULPDU\ interlocutor as well as the broader Anti-Federalist-dominated
political climate in New York sheds helpful light on a number of HDPLOWRQ¶VVWDWHPHQWV
not least of which is his particularly sunny portrayal of the unlikelihood of judicial
overreach.
&RQVLGHULQWKDWUHJDUGKRZ+DPLOWRQ¶V134 arguments track %UXWXV¶FHQWUDOFODLPV
that the federal judges under the proposed system are too independent, judicial review
places the Supreme Court above Congress and the people, that this will result in the
VWDWHV¶GHVWUXFWLRQDQGWKHDSSHOODWHUHYLHZRIIDFWVZLOOsubvert the right to trial by jury.
In Federalist No. 78+DPLOWRQIDPRXVO\UHVSRQGVWKDWLQIDFWWKHMXGLFLDU\LV³WKHOHDVW
GDQJHURXV´EUDQFK135 that judicial independence is necessary to protect the states from
Congressional overreach,136 and that the proposed Constitution does not make the
MXGLFLDU\VXSUHPHEXWPHUHO\HVWDEOLVKHV³DQLQWHUPHGLDWHERG\EHWZHHQWKHSHRSOHDQG
129. Federal Farmer XV, in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST WRITINGS OF THE MELANCTON SMITH CIRCLE, supra
note 7, at 130±31.
130. THE ANTI-FEDERALIST WRITINGS OF THE MELANCTON SMITH CIRCLE, supra note 7, at 422.
131. Id. at 423.
132. Id. at 420±23.
133. But see, e.g., Treanor, supra note 14; Shlomo Slonim, Federalist No. 78 and Brutus’ Neglected Thesis
on Judicial Supremacy, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 7±31 (2006).
134. As I develop below, it seems to me that Federalist Nos. 78–83 reveal especially Hamilton’s position as
to the judiciary, not necessarily Madison¶s (or Jay¶s for that matter). For this reason, I refer to Hamilton instead
of ³Publius´ throughout this section, although I otherwise remain agnostic about whether it is productive to
treat Publius as expressing a consistent position throughout the Federalist Papers. For extended treatments of
the ³split-personality´ thesis, compare George W. Carey, Publius—A Split Personality?, 46 REV. POL. 5±22
(1984), with Thomas Mason, The Federalist—A Split Personality, 57 AM. HIST. REV. 625±43, and GOTTFRIED
DIETZE, THE FEDERALIST: A CLASSIC ON FEDERALISM AND FREE GOVERNMENT (1960), and Douglass Adair,
The Authorship of the Disputed Federalist Papers, 1 WM. & MARY Q. 97±122 (1944).
135. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 402±03 (Alexander Hamilton).
136. Id. at 403.
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WKH OHJLVODWXUH´ WR HQIRUFH the people’s supremacy.137 Later, in Federalist Nos. 80 and
81, Hamilton champions judicial review as a QDWXUDOH[WHQVLRQIURP³WKHJHQHUDOWKHRU\
RIDOLPLWHGFRQVWLWXWLRQ´138 and as decidedly better than the British model of legislative
supremacy, which Brutus cites,139 because it respects the separation of powers.140
Finally, in Federalist Nos. 81 and 83, +DPLOWRQGHIHQGVWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VDSSHOODWH
MXULVGLFWLRQ³RYHUODZDQGIDFW´DQGWKHSURSRVHG&RQVWLWXWLRQ¶VRYHUDOOWUHDWPHQWRIWKH
right to trial by jury.141
7RIXOO\DSSUHFLDWHKRZ+DPLOWRQ¶VFRQFHSWLRQRIWKHMXGLFLDU\FRQWUDVWVZLWKWKDW
of the Anti-Federalists, however, one must start not only with Brutus, but²as Hamilton
himself counsels at the very beginning of his discussion of the courts 142²also with
Federalist Nos. 15–22, the earlier installments of the Federalist Papers GHDOLQJZLWK³WKH
insufILFLHQF\ RI WKH SUHVHQW FRQIHGHUDWLRQ´ RI ZKLFK QXPEHUV     DQG 
were authored by Hamilton).143 As referenced in the discussion in Part I of the various
conceptions of federalism presented at the Constitutional Convention, 144 Federalist Nos.
15 and 16 SURYLGHWKHFODVVLFVWDWHPHQWRIWKH9LUJLQLD3ODQ¶VFRUHVWUDWHJ\WRPLQLPL]H
conflicts between the two completely-formed, parallel levels of government²national
and state²by allowing the federal government to operate directly on individual
citizens.145 %XW ZKDW LV HDVLO\ PLVVHG LQ WKH FRXUVH RI WKLV GLVFXVVLRQ DUH +DPLOWRQ¶V
comments about the judiciary’s role in this plan. For what arm of government actually
applies the law to individuals but the judiciary? As Hamilton himself states:
Government implies the power of making laws. It is essential to the idea of a law, that it be
attended with a sanction; or, in other words, a penalty or punishment for disobedience. . . .
This penalty, whatever it may be, can only be inflicted in two ways; by the agency of the
courts and ministers of justice, or by military force; by the COERCION of the magistracy,
or by the COERCION of arms.146

$FFRUGLQJO\ ZKLOH WKH MXGLFLDU\ PD\ EH WKH ³OHDVW GDQJHURXV´ EUDQFK IRU
Hamilton it is also one of the most important²and this is so for at least two reasons.
First, as discussed previously, the judiciary now filled the critical role of preventing state
overreach, functioning as the lynchpin of the whole system, which Madison had

137. Id. at 404.
138. Id. at 418.
139. Brutus XV, in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST WRITINGS OF THE MELANCTON SMITH CIRCLE, supra note 7, at
257±61.
140. THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 418±19 (Alexander Hamilton).
141. Id. at 423±25, 430±42.
142. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 401 (Alexander Hamilton) (stating that ³the utility and necessity of a
federal judicature have been clearly pointed out´ in the earlier letters that ³unfold[ed] the defects of the existing
confederation´).
143. For the initial roadmap of the argument of the Federalist Papers, see Federalist 1, in THE FEDERALIST
4 (noting that after discussing ³[t]he utility of the UNION´ Publius will discuss ³[t]he insufficiency of the
present confederation to preserve that Union´). For confirmation that Federalist Nos. 15–22 constitute this
section, see also Federalist 15, in THE FEDERALIST 68; Federalist 23, in THE FEDERALIST 112.
144. See supra notes 36±55 and accompanying text.
145. THE FEDERALIST NOS. 15±16, at 72±75, 77±80 (Alexander Hamilton) (insisting that ³we must extend
the authority of the union to the persons of the citizens´ in order to avoid applying ³the COERCION of arms´
to the states).
146. THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, at 72 (Alexander Hamilton).
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originally hoped to assign to Congress. But, second, as a rather Hobbesian-sounding
Hamilton emphasizes in these earlier letters, there is a close connection between the
power to punish citizens and the creation of a government worthy of respect. In
Federalist 17, HamilWRQVXJJHVWVWKDW³WKHRUGLQDU\DGPLQLVWUDWLRQRIFULPLQDODQGFLYLO
MXVWLFH´ LV WKH ³PRVW SRZHUIXO PRVW XQLYHUVDO DQG PRVW DWWUDFWLYH VRXUFH RI SRSXODU
REHGLHQFH DQG DWWDFKPHQW´147 Later, while summarizing his critique of the Articles of
Confederation, Hamilton states:
The result of these observations to an intelligent mind must be clearly this, that if it be
possible at any rate to construct a federal government capable of regulating the common
concerns, and preserving the general tranquility . . . [t]he majesty of the national authority
must be manifested through the medium of the courts of justice. The government of the
union, like that of each state, must be able to address itself immediately to the hopes and
fears of individuals; and to attract to its support, those passions, which have the strongest
influence on the human heart.148

1RWH KHUH +DPLOWRQ¶V VSHFLDO HPSKDVLV RQ WKH FRQQHFWLRQ EHWZHHQ ³WKH PDMHVW\ RI WKH
QDWLRQDODXWKRULW\´³WKHFRXUWV´DQG³WKRVHSDVVLRQVZKLFKKDYHWKHVWURQJHVWLQIOXHnce
RQ WKH KXPDQ KHDUW´ In light of these comments, it should come as no surprise that,
shortly after this, in a seldom referenced portion of Federalist No. 22, Hamilton goes so
IDU DV WR FDOO WKH ODFN RI D MXGLFLDU\ ³D FLUFXPVWDQFH ZKLFK FURZQV WKH GHIHFts of the
FRQIHGHUDWLRQ´149
:LWK WKLV EDFNJURXQG LQ PLQG ZH DUH QRZ SUHSDUHG WR WXUQ WR +DPLOWRQ¶V
treatment of federal inferior courts in Federalist Nos. 81 and 82, a discussion which
WDNHV RQ DGGHG LPSRUWDQFH LQ OLJKW RI %UXWXV¶ SURSRVDO WR VXEVWLWXWH Vtate courts in the
IHGHUDOLQIHULRUFRXUWV¶SODFH Following from the comments above as well as what has
EHHQ SUHYLRXVO\ QRWHG DERXW WKH )HGHUDOLVWV¶ JRDO RI PLQLPL]LQJ VWDWH DJHQF\ LQ WKH
federal government, one would expect Hamilton to return immediately to the claim that a
well-developed system of federal inferior courts is necessary for the federal government
to gain the support of the people.
But Hamilton is more creative and politically savvy than that. After conceding that
³WKHILWQHVVDQGFRPSHWHQF\RIVWDWHFRXUWVVKRXOGEHJUDQWHGLQWKHXWPRVWODWLWXGH´DQG
that Congress could (at least arguably) assign such a role to state courts under the
Constitution, Hamilton goes on to tactfully mention several reasons why state courts, in
fact, might not be trusted to apply federal law after all.150 These reasons include state
FRXUWV¶ WHQGHQF\ WRZDUG ³D ORFDO VSLULW´ WKHLU ODFN RI LQGHSHQGHQFH DQG WKH
inconvenience of a system in which appeals are the norm²an inconvenience which
would be all the more necessary for accomplishing uniformity if there were no inferior
federal courts.151 2QO\WKHQGRHV+DPLOWRQDVVHUWWKDWLWLV³QHFHVVDU\WKDWWKHSRZHURI
constituting inferior courts should exist in the full extent in which it is seen in the
147. Id. at 82.
148. Id. at 78.
149. Id. at 110.
150. THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 421 (Alexander Hamilton).
151. Id. (stating that ³if there was a necessity for confiding to [state courts] the original cognizance of causes
arising under [federal] law[], there would be a correspondent necessity for leaving the door of appeal as wide
as possible´) (emphasis mine).
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proposed constitutiRQ´ DQG GHVFULEH D SODQ IRU LQVWLWXWLQJ D PRGHVW QXPEHU RI IHGHUDO
district courts possessing original jurisdiction over cases arising under federal law. 152
+DPLOWRQ¶V WUHDWPHQW RI WKH UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ VWDWH DQG IHGHUDO FRXUWV WDNHV
another unexpected turn in Federalist No. 82, where he goes so far as to recommend that
state courts be allowed to exercise concurrent jurisdiction over all federal claims as long
as Congress has not explicitly directed to the contrary.153 In other words, like Brutus,
Hamilton here expresses a willingness to allow state courts to hear (at least initially) a
great number of cases involving federal law. At first blush, this seems to stand in blatant
opposition to the common Federalist goal of excluding state agency in the federal
JRYHUQPHQW DV ZHOO DV WKH 9LUJLQLD 3ODQ¶V DVSLUDWLRQ WR PDLQWDLQ D VWULFW VHSDUDWLRQ
between the two parallel governmental systems. Granted, as Hamilton subsequently
suggests, many Federalists likely assumed that the states would have concurrent
jurisdiction over at least some federal causes of action considering that the prevailing
law-of-nations paradigm permitted the courts of one nation to apply the laws of another
on some occasions.154 But this puzzling aspect of Federalist No. 82 is only further
problematized E\+DPLOWRQ¶VDQVZHUWRWKHILQDOTXHVWLRQKHVHWVIRUKLPVHOILQWKHOHWWHU
³>&@RXOG DQ DSSHDO EH PDGH WR OLH IURP WKH VWDWH FRXUWV WR WKH VXERUGLQDWH IHGHUDO
MXGLFDWRULHV"´155 Hamilton responds in the affirmative, declarinJWKDW³PDQ\DGYDQWDJHV
attending [this arrangement] . . PD\EHLPDJLQHG´156 Hamilton continues:
[Allowing federal inferior courts to hear appeals from state courts] would diminish the
motives to the multiplication of federal courts, and would admit of arrangements calculated
to contract the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court. The state tribunals may then be
left with a more entire charge of federal causes; and appeals in most cases in which they
may be deemed proper, instead of being carried to the supreme court, may be made to lie
from the state courts, to district courts of the union.157

So, here, we have the allegedly nationalist Hamilton championing a solution that
would minimize the necessity of setting up federal courts and give state courts a broader
role in interpreting federal law. Had Hamilton somehow been converted to the cause of
encouraging state agency in the federal government in order to protect the states? Or, is

152. Id. at 421±23.
153. THE FEDERALIST NO. 82, at 427 (Alexander Hamilton) (³I am even of opinion, that in every case in
which they were not expressly excluded by the future acts of the national legislature, they will of course take
cognizance of the causes to which those acts may give birth.´).
154. For a comprehensive treatment of this aspect of the law of nations framework, see generally Anthony J.
Bellia, Jr., Congressional Power and State Court Jurisdiction, 94 GEO. L.J. 949 (2006). In this regard, as
Hamilton goes on to explain, if Congress were to disallow state courts from hearing all claims arising under
federal law, this would have given foreign courts more power than state courts. In Hamilton¶s own words:
The judiciary power of every government looks beyond its own local or municipal laws, and in civil
cases, lays hold of all subjects of litigation between parties within its jurisdiction, though the causes
of dispute are relative to the laws of the most distant part of the globe. Those of Japan, not less than
of New York, may furnish the objects of legal discussion to our courts.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 82, at 427±28 (Alexander Hamilton). A key difference between a court of Japan applying
federal law and a court of New York, however, was obviously that one of these courts sits within the territorial
boundaries of the United States and the other does not.
155. Id. at 429.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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WKLVDQH[DPSOHRI+DPLOWRQ¶VSULRULWL]LQJWKHSROLWLFDOJRDORIJHWWing the Constitution
ratified in Anti-)HGHUDOLVW1HZ<RUNRYHUDSXUHDUWLFXODWLRQRIWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQ¶VEDVLF
principles?
:KLOH SROLWLFDO FDOFXODWLRQV QR GRXEW KDG VRPH LQIOXHQFH RQ +DPLOWRQ¶V UKHWRULF
here,158 ,WKLQNWKH³+DPLOWRQDVERUQ-again Anti-FedeUDOLVW´WKHVLVFDQEHGLVPLVVHGRQ
other grounds. A hint toward a key difference between Hamilton¶V DQG%UXWXV¶KRSHVIRU
the judiciary appears at the beginning of Federalist No. 82, where Hamilton states that
³>W@LPHRQO\can mature and perfect so compound a system, liquidate the meaning of all
the SDUWV DQG DGMXVW WKHP WR HDFK RWKHU LQ D KDUPRQLRXV DQG FRQVLVWHQW :+2/(´ 159
+DPLOWRQ ODWHU FRQWLQXHV WKLV WKHPH DVVHUWLQJ WKDW WKH VWDWH FRXUWV¶ FRQFXUUHQW
MXULVGLFWLRQ IROORZV IURP WKH IDFW WKDW ³WKH VWDWH Jovernments and the national
governments . . >DUH@SDUWVRI21(:+2/(´160 Hamilton repeats this language a final
WLPH LQ WKH IROORZLQJ SDUDJUDSK DJDLQ UHFRPPHQGLQJ WKDW ³WKH QDWLRQDO DQG VWDWH
V\VWHPV DUH WR EH UHJDUGHG DV 21( :+2/(´ 161 Here, however, Hamilton is more
suggestive about the consequences of this characterization, stating that it follows that
VWDWHFRXUWV³ZLOO . . be natural auxiliaries to the execution of the laws RIWKHXQLRQ´DQG
will be controlled by the Supreme Court, a bod\ ³GHVWLQHG WR XQLWH DQG DVVLPLODWH WKH
SULQFLSOHVRIQDWLRQDOMXVWLFHDQGWKHUXOHVRIQDWLRQDOGHFLVLRQ´162
The nationalist Hamilton returns! ,QGHHG RQFH RQH PRYHV EH\RQG +DPLOWRQ¶V
state-friendly flourishes to reflect upon the actual system he proposes, it becomes clear
that, in permitting appeals from state courts to lower federal courts, Hamilton reduces
state courts to a station below, not beside, inferior federal courts. The following chart
illustrates this difference between Brutus and Hamilton:163

158. See Campbell, supra note 16, at 1118±19, 1129 (arguing that, in the similar context of commandeering
state officers for collecting federal taxes, Hamilton adopted a more state agency-friendly rhetorical strategy in
Federalist 36 than he had in earlier debates about the ³1783 Compromise´).
159. THE FEDERALIST NO. 82, at 426 (Alexander Hamilton).
160. Id. at 428.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. I use the terms ³superior´ and ³inferior´ in the chart below (as opposed to district, appellate, or
supreme) because most state judiciaries in 1789 operated in a different manner than modern systems. See RITZ,
supra note 11, at 27±52; but see GOEBEL, supra note 6, at 468 (remarking that ³no belief was more ingrained in
this country than that courts were properly to be ordered in terms of inferior and superior jurisdiction´). With
the exception of Virginia, no state at the time had yet instituted intermediate appellate courts, nor were judicial
opinions published in reports. RITZ, supra note 11, at 48. Also, as was previously noted, state superior courts
sometimes conducted new trials on appeal. Id. at 38±41. Moreover, despite the fact that multiple levels of
courts were common in state systems at the time, a shared ³corps of judges´ would generally staff the courts in
such a way that a given judge could sit at any level on the hierarchy. Id. at 6.
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Brutus’ Judiciary
h͘^͘
^ƵƉƌĞŵĞ
ŽƵƌƚ

&ĞĚĞƌĂů/ŶĨĞƌŝŽƌŽƵƌƚƐ

^ƚĂƚĞ^ƵƉĞƌŝŽƌŽƵƌƚƐ

^ƚĂƚĞ/ŶĨĞƌŝŽƌŽƵƌƚƐ

&ĞĚĞƌĂů
ŝƌĐƵŝƚŽƵƌƚƐ
;ŝĨĐƌĞĂƚĞĚďǇ
ŽŶŐƌĞƐƐͿ

^ƚĂƚĞ
^ƵƉĞƌŝŽƌ
ŽƵƌƚƐ

&ĞĚĞƌĂů
ŝƐƚƌŝĐƚŽƵƌƚƐ
;ŝĨĐƌĞĂƚĞĚďǇ
ŽŶŐƌĞƐƐͿ

^ƚĂƚĞ/ŶĨĞƌŝŽƌ
ŽƵƌƚƐ

Instead of granting states a degree of agency in the federal government in order to
defend their existence (like Brutus), +DPLOWRQ¶V V\VWHP VLPSO\ IROGV WKHP LQWR WKH
IHGHUDOMXGLFLDU\¶VRZQKLHUDUFK\ 7REHVXUHWKHIDFWWKDW+DPLOWRQ¶VVWDWHFRXUWVFRXOG
regularly interpret federal law is not an unimportant concession. But notice that, under
+DPLOWRQ¶VDSSURDFKOLWLJDQWVpresumably have two entry points into the system²either
at the state or federal trial court level²and therefore have some disincentive toward
starting at the lowest rung. &RPELQH WKLV ZLWK +DPLOWRQ¶V PHQWLRQ RI ZRUGV OLNH
³DVVLPLODWe´KLVFRPPHQWVDERXWWhe defects of state courts, and his earlier admonition
about the importance of a federal judiciary that can directly inspire fear and respect, and
one could easily forgive an Anti-)HGHUDOLVWOHIWXQFRQYLQFHGRI+DPLOWRQ¶VVWDWHV-rights
bona fides.
Due to its importance to some Anti-)HGHUDOLVWV¶ODWHUSROLWLFDOVWUDWHJ\LWLVZRUWK
QRWLQJWKDWWKLVDVSHFWRI+DPLOWRQ¶VUHVSRQVHPD\YHU\ZHOOKDYHEHHQUHVSRQVLEOHIRU
convincing especially Anti-Federalists in Virginia that perhaps granting state courts a
role in the federal judicial hierarchy was not such a good idea after all. For example,
Patrick Henry, who took this stance during the Virginia ratification convention in lateJune of 1788, argued that vesting the authority to interpret federal law in state courts
ZRXOG FRPSURPLVH VWDWH MXGLFLDO LQGHSHQGHQFH E\ PDNLQJ VWDWH MXGJHV VXEMHFW WR ³WZR
PDVWHUV´164 *LYHQ +HQU\¶V SROLWLFDO VWDQGLQJ DQG OHJHQGDU\ UKHWRULFDO VNLOO RWKHU
Virginia Anti-Federalists like future Senator William Grayson also fell in line with this
view.165 7KDW +HQU\¶V DSSURDFK ZDV OLNHO\ Dt least partially obstructionist, however, is
indicated by the Virginia Anti-)HGHUDOLVWV¶ IXUWKHU GHPDQG WKDW &RQJUHVV DOVR EH
prohibited from creating federal inferior courts²thus leaving the U.S. Supreme Court as
the only body that would hear cases arising under federal law. 166
164. 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1419 (John P. Kaminski
et al. eds., 1978) [hereinafter 10 DHRC].
165. Id. at 1445 (suggesting that it would be ³extremely disgraceful´ for ³[t]he independent Judges of
Virginia . . . to be subordinate[d] to the Federal Judiciary´).
166. See id. at 1762 (noting Henry¶s subsequently expressed commitment to ³µoppose every measure¶ for
putting the Constitution into motion unless [Congress] called for a second [constitutional] convention´); see
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But, to return to Hamilton, if his conception of the judiciary fits poorly with
Dickinson Federalism, neither does it accord with the course charted by Madison or the
Virginia Plan, as it flatly violates the principle of keeping federal and state governments
separate from one another. 7R EH VXUH HDFK RI WKH &RQYHQWLRQ¶V FRQFHSWLRQV RI
federalism required some point of contact between the national and state governments,
and the delegaWHV¶ RZQ VWUDWHJ\ ZDV WR ORFDWH WKLV MXQFWLRQ LQ WKH MXGLFLDO EUDQFK But
rather than minimizing the overlap between state and federal judiciaries, Hamilton here
maximizes it. 7R XVH WRGD\¶V MXGLFLDU\ DV DQ LOOXVWUDWLRQ FOHDUO\ LW ZRXOG EH QR VPDOO
difference if 108 different federal courts (district, circuit, and supreme), all with a large
number of judges, were empowered to hear appeals from the state level instead of a
single court of nine justices with an appellate caseload limited by the certiorari
process.167 In that regard, if one were tasked with selecting the version of federalism
IURP WKH &RQYHQWLRQ ZLWK ZKLFK +DPLOWRQ¶V VWUDWHJ\ PRVW FORVHO\ WUDFNV WKH DQVZHU
ZRXOG VHHP WR EH +DPLOWRQ¶V RZQ DSSURDFK WR FRQVROLGDWH WKH VWDWHV LQWR D unified
national system.168
7KDW+DPLOWRQ¶VSUHIHUUHGLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRI$UWLFOH,,,ZRXOGKDYHUHVXOWHGLQD
UREXVWIHGHUDOMXGLFLDU\DWWKHVWDWHV¶H[SHQVHLVIXUWKHUVXSSRUWHGE\UHPDUNVKHPDGHLQ
a different series of pseudonymously published articles appearing more than ten years
later. 6SHFLILFDOO\DIWHU-HIIHUVRQ¶VFRQWURYHUVLDOHOHFWLRQWRWKH3UHVLGHQF\LQDQG
just prior to the Anti-)HGHUDOLVWV¶UHSHDORIWKH)HGHUDOLVW-inspired Judiciary Act of 1801
(which would have created twenty-three additional inferior federal judicial posts169),
Hamilton had the opportunity to comment on the framework adopted by the Judiciary
Act of 1789 in a series of articles titled the ³([DPLQDWLRQ´170 There, in the sixth
installment of the series, Hamilton flatly states that the original Judiciary Act was
³LQDGHTXDWH WRLWVREMHFWDQGLQFDSDEOHRIEHLQJFDUULHGLQWR H[HFXWLRQ´ 171 And while
WKLVFODLPLVPDGHPRVWGLUHFWO\LQFRQQHFWLRQZLWKWKH$FW¶VFLUFXLW-riding requirement,
Hamilton subsequently raises a number of ³LQVXSHUDEOHREMHFWLRQV´WRKDYLQJVWDWHFRXUWV
hear federal claims in the first instance, subject only to Supreme Court appellate
review.172 +DPLOWRQ¶VFRPSODLQWVRQWKLVRFFDVLRQ²that state courts will have local bias,
that a system in which appeals are the norm encourages unnecessary expense and delay,
also id. at 1555 (listing, among the proposed amendments that Virginia attached to its ratification, that the
judiciary consist only of ³one Supreme Court´ and ³such Courts of Admiralty as Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish´).
167. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 4, at 41, 43 (noting that, as of September 30, 2013, there were ninetyfour district courts with 677 authorized district judgeships and 346 senior district judges, and thirteen circuit
courts with 179 authorized judgeships and eighty-nine senior circuit court judges).
168. As additional support for this portrayal of Hamilton, consider his discussion in Federalist 17 comparing
the conflict between state and federal governments to the historical conflicts in European feudal systems. THE
FEDERALIST NO. 17, at 82±84 (Alexander Hamilton). There, if one follows the analogy, Hamilton¶s suggestion
is that, just as either the monarch or the aristocracy eventually supplanted the other in their conflicts over the
affections of the people, either the federal or state governments would ultimately come to dominate the other
under the American Constitution. Id.
169. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, 8 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 278 (Henry Cabot Lodge ed.,
1904).
170. The long title for the series is ³The Examination of Jefferson¶s Message to Congress of December, 7
1801.´Id. at 246.
171. Id. at 278.
172. Id. at 278, 280.
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and that the federal government should have its own courts to enforce its own laws²are
familiar, with the exception that Hamilton seems to have changed his mind about
whether states can constitutionally be made to perform the role of interpreting federal
law.173 %XW WKH NH\ SRLQW LV WKDW +DPLOWRQ¶V UHPDUNV IXUWKHUFRQILUP WKDW LQ KLV PLQG
the broad use of state courts to interpret federal law was never ideal.
Though Hamilton was the most prominent Federalist to provide a lengthy defense
of Article III, other Federalists also addressed the topic. One particularly relevant, albeit
brief, contribution was already mentioned²that of Oliver Ellsworth. Recall that
Ellsworth held the Federalist party-line in noting the importance of establishing federal
inferior courts to interpret federal law, 174 but also suggested that state courts might hear
IHGHUDOFODLPVLQWKH³ILUVWLQVWDQFH´175 Because Connecticut was one of the first states
to ratify the Constitution, howevHU (OOVZRUWK¶V PLQLPDOO\-developed comments came
ORQJEHIRUH%UXWXVDQG+DPLOWRQ¶VFRQWULEXWLRQVDQGLQDVWDWHLQZKLFKUDWLILFDWLRQZDV
never in doubt.176
0DGLVRQ¶VRZQDSSURDFKWR$UWLFOH,,,LVDWOHDVWSDUWO\VSHOOHGRXWLQUHFRUGVRID
speech he gave at the Virginia ratifying convention on June 20, 1788. There, in
defending federal court jurisdiction over claims arising under federal law, Madison
FODLPHGWKDW³LW>ZDV@VRQHFHVVDU\DQGH[SHGLHQWWKDWWKH>IHGHUDO@-XGLFLDOSRZHUVKRXOG
correspond witK WKH >IHGHUDO@ /HJLVODWLYH´ DV WR QRW GHVHUYH DQ\ REMHFWLRQ177 Later,
Madison provides a more thoroughgoing statement in support of federal judicial power
(albeit in the immediate context of the interpretation of treaties), remarking that
³>F@RQWURYHUVLHV affecting the interest of the United States, ought to be determined by
WKHLU RZQ -XGLFLDU\ DQG QRW WR EH OHIW WR SDUWLDO ORFDO WULEXQDOV´ 178 Madison does
VXEVHTXHQWO\WHPSHUWKLVSRVLWLRQVRPHZKDWJUDQWLQJWKDW³>L@WZLOOEHDOVRLQWKHSRZHU
of Congress to vest [judicial] power in the State Courts . . . when they find the tribunals
RI WKH 6WDWHV HVWDEOLVKHG RQ JRRG IRRWLQJ´179 But later statements in the diversity
jurisdiction context again make it seem like state courts will be limited to hearing
controversies between citizens of the same state involving only state law.180 Similar to
Hamilton, then, Madison never provides theoretical resources for why one would want to
give state courts federal judicial power²and, in fact, the reader is left with the
impression that the opposite strategy would be more advisable. Unlike Hamilton,
however, Madison also never gives any indication that inferior federal courts might hear
appeals from the states. 6R WKLV VQDSVKRW RI 0DGLVRQ¶V FRQFHSWLRQ RI WKH MXGLFLDU\
appears to chart a course between Hamilton and Brutus.
Other Federalist presentations at the Virginia ratifying convention sounded similar
173. Id. at 280±82 (³[I]t is not to be forgotten that the right to employ the agency of the State Courts, for
executing the laws of the Union, is liable to question, and has, in fact, been seriously questioned´).
174. 3 DHRC, supra note 71, at 484 (noting that ³[a] legislative power without a judicial and executive
under their own control is in the nature of things a nullity´).
175. Id. at 490 (suggesting that ³all the cases, except the few in which [the Supreme Court] has original and
not appellate jurisdiction, may in the first instance be had in state courts . . ´).
176. See GOEBEL, supra note 6, at 299±300, 337±39.
177. 1 DHRC, supra note 70, at 1413.
178. Id. at 1414.
179. Id. at 1417.
180. Id. at 1418.
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notes. Like Madison, John Marshall expressed incredulity over the Virginia Anti)HGHUDOLVWV¶ DUJXPHQWV WKDW &RQJUHVV VKRXOG not create inferior federal courts or that
³DULVLQJ XQGHU´ MXULVGLFWLRQ VKRXOG EH H[FOXGHG IURP VXFK FRXUWV Concerning the
FUHDWLRQRILQIHULRUFRXUWV0DUVKDOOVWDWHGWKDW³VRIDUIURPEHLQJDGHIHFWRIWKHV\VWHP
[that it allows Congress to establish inferior courts] . . . it seems necessary to the
SHUIHFWLRQ RI WKLV V\VWHP´181 $QG RQ WKH ³DULVLQJ XQGHU´ MXULVGLFWLRQ SRLQW 0DUVKDOO
remarked:
Is it not necessary that the Federal Courts should have cognizance of cases arising under
the Constitution, and the laws of the United States? What is the service or purpose of a
Judiciary, but to execute the laws in a peaceable orderly manner, without shedding blood,
or creating a contest, or availing yourselves of force? If this be the case, where can its
jurisdiction be more necessary than here?182

Edmund Pendleton had a similar take, clearly supporting both the creation of
LQIHULRU IHGHUDO FRXUWV DQG WKHLU SRVVHVVLRQ RI ³DULVLQJ XQGHU´ MXULVGLFWLRQ 183 Edmund
Randolph, who eventually sided with the Federalists, also threw his weight behind these
points.184
Ultimately, then, an important consensus emerges from the Federalist side
FRQFHUQLQJ$UWLFOH,,,¶VLPSOHPHQWDWLRQ The Federalists all held that it was necessary for
Congress to create inferior federal courts with jurisdiction over cases involving federal
law. To be sure, inner-party disagreements existed on matters like the extent to which
states might possess concurrent jurisdiction over federal claims, whether this type of
state court involvement was to be anything more than a short-term strategy to help secure
WKH&RQVWLWXWLRQ¶VUDWLILFDWLRQDQGEURDGHUDFFHSWDQFHDQGZKHWKHUIHGHUDOLQIHULRUFRXUWV
would be able to hear appeals from state courts. But the general principle whose origin
can be traced back to the Virginia Plan²that the federal government should possess its
own fully-developed judiciary²was a core doctrine.
1RWZLWKVWDQGLQJWKH)HGHUDOLVWV¶QDUURZYLFWRU\LQWKHVXPPHURIKRZHYHU
it would be wrong to equate this success with any consensus concerning the judiciary.
Six of the states that ratified the Constitution simultaneously advanced amendments to
the document and, of those six, all but one sought some alteration of Article III.185
9LUJLQLD¶VUDWLILFDWLRQDPHQGPHQWs, for example, enumerated a whole host of changes to
Article III²including the specification that Congress could only create inferior
³DGPLUDOW\FRXUWV´DQGWKDW³WKH6XSUHPH&RXUWVK>RXOG@KDYHDSSHOODWHMXULVGLFWLRQ as
to matters of law only, except in cases of equity, and of admiralty, and maritime
jurisdiction . . . ´186 1RUWK &DUROLQD¶V SURSRVHG DPHQGPHQWV DOVR DLPHG WR DEROLVK
federal appellate review of fact questions in most cases.187 And, among other things,
1HZ <RUN¶V UDWLI\LQJ DPHQGPHQWV ZRXOG KDYH HOLPLQDWHG &RQJUHVV¶ DELOLW\ WR FUHDWH

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id. at 1431.
10 DHRC, supra note 164, at 1432.
Id. at 1426±27.
Id. at 1450±52.
See FALLON ET AL., supra note 4, at 19.
2 DHRC, supra note 87, at 145±46, 160, 377±85.
Id. at 266±76, 290.
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LQIHULRU IHGHUDO FRXUWV VRXJKW WR UHVWULFW IHGHUDO FRXUWV IURP KHDULQJ ³DQ\ 6XLW E\ DQ\
3HUVRQDJDLQVWD6WDWH´DQGZRXOGKDYHUHTXLUHGWKDWMXURUVLQFULPLQDOFDVHVEHVHOHFWHG
IURP ³WKH &RXQW\ ZKHUH WKH &ULPH ZDV FRPPLWWHG´188 In this way, despite the
)HGHUDOLVWV¶ YLFWRU\ WKH SROLWLFDO ZLQGV ZHUH GHFLGHGO\ DJDLQVW WKHLU FRQFHSWLRQ RI WKH
judiciary.
IV. THE JUDICIARY IN THE FIRST CONGRESS
The stage is now set to return to the question posed at the beginning of the article:
If the Federalists dominated the first Congress and Connecticut Federalist Oliver
Ellsworth was primarily responsible for drafting the Judiciary and Process Acts of 1789,
why connect the initial implementation of Article III with the Anti-Federalists? Up to
this point, I have tried to show a fundamental theoretical difference between most AntiFederalists and Federalists on how to balance federal and state power. Where the
Federalists saw the need for a federal supervisory power to prevent state overreach,
Brutus and other Anti-Federalists wanted the states to have agency in the federal
government to protect against the opposite danger. The Constitution employed the
federal judiciary to negotiate conflicts between these parallel levels of government so²
IRU WKH )HGHUDOLVWV¶ VWUDWHJ\ WR ZRUN²the federal judiciary needed to be robust and
independent. The Anti-Federalists, on the other hand, thought they could go a long way
to preventing a national consolidation if state courts interpreted federal law in the first
instance.
This is why it was remarkable that the original federal judiciary was not robust and
independent. ,QVWHDG LW ZDV VPDOO ODFNHG JHQHUDO ³DULVLQJ XQGHU´ MXULVGLFWLRQ DQG
granted state courts the primary responsibility for interpreting and applying federal law.
The ratify-now, amend-later compromises struck during ratification had underscored the
need to mollify the Anti-Federalists, especially on the subject of the federal judiciary.
$QG2OLYHU(OOVZRUWK¶V'LFNHQVRQ)HGHUDOLVWURRWV provided a theoretical foundation for
the new system.
7XUQLQJ WR WKH GHWDLOV RI WKH ILUVW &RQJUHVV¶ SODQ WKHUH ZHUH WKUHH NH\ SLHFHV RI
legislation that related to the judiciary. The first two, the Bill of Rights and the Judiciary
Act, were among the sesVLRQ¶VPRVWLPSRUWDQWSULRULWLHV²the Bill of Rights owing most
GLUHFWO\WR0DGLVRQ¶VZRUNLQWKH+RXVHRI5HSUHVHQWDWLYHVDQGWKH-XGLFLDU\$FWWRWKH
efforts of Ellsworth in the Senate.189 The Process Act, on the other hand, was
supplemental to the Judiciary Act (specifically to §14) and, mostly because of the late
date on which it was reported and the unexpected degree of controversy it created, its
final stripped-down form was hastily settled upon.190
Beginning with the Bill of Rights, despite the fact that it arose in a different house
of Congress than the Judiciary and Process Acts, many scholars have suspected a
188. Id. at 190±203.
189. Of course, both the House and the Senate were involved in all of these enactments, but citations could
be multiplied supporting Oliver Ellsworth¶s dominant influence on the Judiciary and Process Acts. Consider,
for example, James Madison¶s suggestion (although written later in life) that ³[i]t may be taken for certain, that
the bill organizing the judicial department originated in [Ellsworth¶s] draft, and that it was not materially
changed in its passage into law.´Letter from Madison to Joseph Wood (Feb. 27, 1836).
190. See GOEBEL, supra note 6, at 509±10, 535±40.
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probable connection between these measures.191 For one, the timing of their enactments
alone is suggestive of some association. The Senate put its stamp of approval on the Bill
of Rights on September 24, 1789, a mere three days after the House agreed to the final
Senate version of the Judiciary Act.192 Further, as Maeva Marcus and Natalie Wexler
VXPPDUL]HDOWKRXJK³QRGRFXPHQWDU\HYLGHQFHH[LVWVOinking [these bills explicitly] . . .
[i]t is clear from surviving correspondence that those concerned with procuring greater
protection for individual rights divided their efforts between the Bill of Rights being
discussed in the House and the judiciary bLOOEHLQJGHEDWHGLQWKH6HQDWH´193 One final
LQGLFLD RI WKLV FRQQHFWLRQ LV WKH PHDVXUHV¶ RYHUODSSLQJ VXEMHFW PDWWHU Gerhard Casper
KDVQRWHGWKDW³RIWKHHLJKWDPHQGPHQWV>LQWKH%LOORI5LJKWV@WKDWGHDOZLWKVSHFLILFV²
that is not counting the Ninth and Tenth Amendments²five regard matters mostly
FRQFHUQLQJWKHFRXUWV´194 And, if one follows the drafting history of the Bill of Rights,
one sees that, in addition to the provisions that were eventually adopted, Madison had
earlier proposed several direct amendments to Article III²many of which were
presumably dropped because their concerns were addressed in the Judiciary Act itself. 195
In any event, what is especially relevant for the present inquiry is the degree to
which several provisions in the Bill of Rights respond to key Anti-Federalists concerns
about Article III. 7RUHFDOO&DVSHU¶VFRPPHQWDERYHKDOIRIWKHILUVWWHQDPHQGPHQWVWR
the Constitution involve the courts in some manner. The Fourth Amendment addresses
searches and seizures and the issuance of warrants, the Fifth Amendment safeguards
certain key rights of criminal and civil defendants, and the Eighth Amendment addresses
bail and other punishments.196
7KH WZR DPHQGPHQWV WKDW PRVW VTXDUHO\ DGGUHVV %UXWXV¶ SDUWLFXODU FRQFHUQV
however, are the Sixth and Seventh Amendments. 5HFDOODJDLQ%UXWXV¶IHDUWKDWKROGLQJ
trials in federal courts would force defendants to travel long distances, thereby
jeopardizing the local character of juries and the ability of key witnesses to appear in
person. The Sixth Amendment requires juries in criminal cases to be drawn from the
district where the crime at issue was committed,197 while the Seventh Amendment
generally preserves the right to jury trials in civil cases, and prohibits federal courts from
reviewing questions of fact.198

191. See, e.g., Gerhard Casper, The Judiciary Act of 1789 and Judicial Independence, in ORIGINS OF THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY: ESSAYS ON THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789, at 281 (Maeva Marcus ed., 2002); RITZ, supra
note 11, at 19±21.
192. See Casper, supra note 191, at 281.
193. Maeva Marcus & Natalie Wexler, The Judiciary Act of 1789, in ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY:
ESSAYS ON THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789, at 27 (Maeva Marcus ed., 2002).
194. See Casper, supra note 191, at 281.
195. See GOEBEL, supra note 6, at 430±32 (noting that Madison proposed, among other things, to place an
amount in controversy requirement on the Supreme Court¶s appellate jurisdiction as well as some further
clarification regarding whether federal court appellate jurisdiction extended to questions of fact); RITZ, supra
note 11, at 21 (providing a similar account, but also noting the Sixth Amendment¶s connection to an
amendment Richard Henry Lee had first proposed to the Judicial Bill).
196. U.S. CONST. amends. IV, V, VIII.
197. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (³In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which
district shall have been previously ascertained by law . . . ´).
198. U.S. CONST. amend. VII (³In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
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Turning to the Judiciary Act itself, most of these same concerns are also taken up
there. In response to the protestations of numerous Anti-Federalists, section 25 of the
Judiciary Act also limits appellate review of questions of fact.199 Section 29 of the
-XGLFLDU\ $FW DGGUHVVHV WKH ULJKW WR D MXU\ GUDZQ IURP RQH¶V YLFLQDJH QDUURZLQJ WKH
boundary line even further than the Sixth Amendment. It required that jurors in cases
involving an offense punishable by death be selected from the county where the offense
was committed.200 Additionally, this section also ties jury selection in all other cases to
state law, which in many cases included other vicinage provisions. 201
This brings us to the key question that Oliver Ellsworth and others had to answer
following the ratification debates: Should Congress set up inferior federal courts with the
power to hear cases arising under federal law (among other categories of jurisdiction),
rely on state courts to fill this role, or select some kind of mixed strategy by giving both
state courts and federal inferior courts concurrent jurisdiction over such claims? As
discussed above, either the first or third options would have been palatable to the
Federalists.202 As for the Anti-Federalists, despite the VirJLQLD FRQWLQJHQW¶V SROLWLFDO
posturing to the contrary,203 %UXWXV¶ SURSRVDO WR JUDQW VWDWH FRXUWV RULJLQDO MXULVGLFWLRQ
over claims that would otherwise be placed in federal inferior courts was the best
realistically-possible result.
Ultimately, although the first Congress voted to establish federal inferior courts,
WKH FRXUWV¶ QDUURZO\ FLUFXPVFULEHG MXULVGLFWLRQ GHPRQVWUDWHV WKH ZD\ LQ ZKLFK LW ZDV
primarily the second option above²that of relying on the states²that Ellsworth
selected.
As support for this claim, consider the three levels of courts established by the Act.
Thirteen federal district courts were created, each with its own judge, and each
corresponding to state lines in a way that was apparently meant to nod to the importance
of the states as independent governmental entities.204 7KH GLVWULFW FRXUWV¶ MXULVGLFWLRQ
ZDV HQWLUHO\ RULJLQDO VR WKH NH\ IHDWXUH RI +DPLOWRQ¶V IUDPHZRUN ZDV UHMHFWHG The
types of cases which these courts could hear was limited to such categories as admiralty
and maritime disputes, a narrow class of federal crimes with minimal penalties, and suits
at common law where the United States was the plaintiff. 205 Importantly, the Act did not
provide for diversity or federal question jurisdiction²a severe curtailment of the
permissible boundaries for federal courts under Article III.206
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in
any court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.´).
199. An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States § 25 (discussing the implications of § 25 of
1 Stat. 73 (1789)), in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 1789±1800,
at 85±86 (Maeva Marcus et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter 4 DHSC].
200. Id. at 92.
201. Id.
202. See supra pp. 29±30.
203. See supra pp. 27±28 and accompanying notes.
204. See An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States § 2 and § 3, in 4 DHSC, supra note 199,
at 39±42; see also GOEBEL, supra note 6, at 471.
205. See An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States § 9, in 4 DHSC, supra note 199, at 53±
54; GOEBEL, supra note 6, at 474 (noting that the District Court¶s exclusive original jurisdiction over admiralty
and maritime cases was ³something that antifederalists generally had conceded was properly federal´).
206. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 4, at 25.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons,

33

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 56 [], Iss. 1, Art. 4

34

TULSA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:1

As to the circuit courts, only three circuits were created, and each was to be staffed
by one federal district court judge and two supreme court justices riding circuit so as to
minimize costs.207 This plan required supreme court justices to regularly traverse the
nation meeting twice annually in two different locations within their respective circuits.
$V0LFKDHO7RWKVXJJHVWVLQWKLVZD\³WKHFUDIWHUVRIWKHMXGLFLDU\ELOODQVZHUHGFULWLFV
who claimed that a federal court system would force Americans to travel several hundred
PLOHVWRWKHVHDWRIJRYHUQPHQWWRGHIHQGWKHPVHOYHVLQFRXUW´208 Or as Judiciary Act
collaborator (and former Constitutional Convention delegate) William Paterson put it in
language echoing Brutus almost word-for-word: the circuit-riding provision would allow
WKHJRYHUQPHQWWRFDUU\³/DZWR>FLWL]HQV@+RPHV&RXUWVWRWKHLU'RRUV´ 209
Plainly, however, the primary way this arrangement brought justice to every
SHUVRQ¶VGRRUZDVQRt by way of circuit-riding, but courtesy of the fact that most cases
were to be heard in state courts. While the jurisdiction given to circuit courts was more
expansive than that of the district courts, here again, Ellsworth declined to grant federal
question jurisdiction to even these courts, leaving the bulk of the work of interpreting
federal law and the newly-minted Constitution to the states.210 Even the most notable
grant of additional power here²WKH FLUFXLW FRXUWV¶ MXULVGLFWLRQ RYHU GLYHUVLW\ DQG
alienage cases²was concurrent with the states and was limited by a (then) sizable
amount in controversy requirement of $500.211 This limitation served at least two
purposes. First, it again responded in part to the Anti-)HGHUDOLVWV¶FRQFHUQWKDWindigent
litigants would be forced to travel great distances to access the courts, as this limitation
meant that only cases involving large sums of money would require such efforts. Second,
the amount in controversy requirement also largely avoided the politically sensitive issue
of pushing alien-debtor cases into federal courts because most such cases would fall
under the $500 threshold.212
6HFWLRQ  RI WKH $FW DGGUHVVHG WKH 6XSUHPH &RXUW¶V MXULVGLFWLRQ UHTXLULQJ WKDW
parties appealing a decision of a staWHRUIHGHUDOFRXUWREWDLQD³ZULWRIHUURU´PHDQLQJ
that only legal questions could be appealed, not questions of fact.213 Next, this section
allowed review of state courts decisions only where the state court held a treaty provision

207. See An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States § 4 and § 5, in 4 DHSC, supra note 199,
at 44; see also Letter from Oliver Ellsworth to Richard Law (Aug. 4, 1789), in 4 DHSC, supra note 199, at 495
(noting that, if one assumes that federal district courts would be created, circuit courts could be added without
³much enhancing the expence´ by staffing them with district judges and justices of the Supreme Court).
208. TOTH, supra note 47, at 159. Marcus et al. make a similar point, stating that the strategy of holding the
circuit courts in various locations was meant to respond to critics charging that the effect of the federal
judiciary would be ³to drag the accused µfrom his house, friends and connexions, to a distant spot, where he is
deprived of every advantage of former character, of relations and acquaintance.¶´DHSC, supra note 204, at
28.
209. 4 DHSC, supra note 199, at 28 (citing ³William Paterson¶s Notes for Remarks on Judiciary Bill, June
23, 1789´). Marcus et al. also quote John Jay¶s statement, made in the opening months of his tenure as the first
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, that ³the new system of inferior courts [w]as one that would carry ³Justice
as it were to every Man¶s Door.´Id.
210. Id. at 59±60.
211. Id.
212. TOTH, supra note 47, at 152.
213. See An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States § 25, in 4 DHSC, supra note 199, at
85±86; TOTH, supra note 47, at 166.
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or federal statute invalid, or where the state court upheld the validity of state law in the
face of a constitutional challenge or claim or federal preemption.214 This means that any
state court decisions over-applying federal law were completely insulated from Supreme
Court review.
Taken together, the parallels between these critical sections of the Judiciary Act
and Brutus XIV are remarkable. Recall again that, although Brutus believed his concerns
about indigent litigants and federal overreach could be (at least partially) addressed by
KDYLQJVWDWHFRXUWVKHDUWKHOLRQ¶VVKDUHRIIHGHUDOFDVHVLQLWLDOO\KH IUHHO\JUDQWHGWKH
need for the United States Supreme Court to hear appeals concerning questions of
law.215 This is exactly the approach that Ellsworth and the rest of Congress adopted.
Toth also sees the connection here, saying:
In Section 25, Ellsworth pursued the course of action that Brutus had recommended. The
Connecticut Federalist accepted the Anti-)HGHUDOLVW¶VVXJJHVWLRQWKDWDOORZLQJVWDWHFRXUWV
to try cases based on federal statutory or constitutional claims, subject to oversight by the
Supreme Court struck the right balance. . . (OOVZRUWK¶VFUDIWLQJRI6HFWLRQGLVDUPHGWKH
SRWHQWLDO RSSRQHQWV WR WKH 6XSUHPH &RXUW¶V DSSHOODWH MXULVGLFWLRQ It encountered no
objection in either the Senate or the House.216

In short, the first Congress went to great lengths to assuage the concerns about federal
judicial overreach that the Anti-)HGHUDOLVWV¶KDGUDLVHGGXULQJWKHUDWLILFDWLRQGHEDWHV
There is still one objection that needs to be addressed, however. That is, if the first
Congress really did respond to most of the Anti-)HGHUDOLVWV¶ FRQFHUQV UHODWLQJ WR WKH
judiciary, then why did several Anti-Federalists in Congress vote against the Judiciary
Act in its final form? As ,DOOXGHGWRDERYHWKHSULPDU\UHDVRQRZHVWR3DWULFN+HQU\¶V
influential decision at the Virginia state ratifying convention to oppose the creation of
federal inferior courts, a position that was folded into his broader political strategy of
attempting to undermine the new Constitution.217 Add to this the fact that several of the
state ratifying conventions had concluded with a call for amendments preventing the
creation of such courts,218 and it is no surprise that several (though not all219) AntiFederalists adopted this more radical position at the first Congress. There were also other

214. See An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States § 25, in 4 DHSC, supra note 199, at
85±86 (permitting review of state court ³final judgment[s] or decrees . . . where is drawn in question the
validity of a treaty or statute of, or an authority exercised under the United States, and the decision is against
their validity; or where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised under the
State, on the ground of their being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and the
decision is in favor of their validity . . ´).
215. See generally THE ANTI-FEDERALIST WRITINGS OF THE MELANCTON SMITH CIRCLE, supra note 7, at
256.
216. See TOTH, supra note 47, at 170.
217. See supra pp. 27±28 and accompanying notes; see also GOEBEL, supra note 6, at 419, 442, 462, 494,
503, 507 (describing various Anti-Federalist votes against the Judiciary Act as well as Patrick Henry¶s attempts
to bring about ³Madison¶s political downfall´); Campbell, supra note 16, at 1148±53 (noting that although the
Anti-Federalists in the first Congress generally opposed the creation of inferior federal courts, they did not
share Henry¶s concern with state courts hearing federal claims).
218. See supra pp. 29±31.
219. Elbridge Gerry, for example, was a prominent Anti-Federalist who argued in favor of the creation of
inferior federal courts. See Brogdon, supra note 3, at 225±27 (discussing the debate about inferior federal
courts in the House of Representatives).
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reasons that Anti-Federalists might have voted against the bill, such as the federal
MXGLFLDOV\VWHP¶VQovelty, its expense, or because they were unsatisfied that it had done
enough to address the new cRQVWLWXWLRQ¶V FRQVROLGDWLQJ WHQGHQF\220 But, viewed in
context, the decision Anti-Federalists in the first Congress made to outflank the
arguments of Brutus (and Federal Farmer) says more about the realities of political
negotiation and how public sentiment had shifted in the Anti-)HGHUDOLVWV¶ IDYRU WKHQ LW
GRHVDERXWWKHIHGHUDOMXGLFLDU\¶VWKHRUHWLFDOKHULWDJH
The final piece of legislation at the first Congress implementing Article III was the
Process Act of 1789, which, as mentioned above, was meant to regulate the procedures
and forms of action to be used in federal courts.221 The same Senate committee that
drafted the Judiciary Act was also responsible for the Process Act.222 Yet this Act was
not destined to share the same smooth path through Congress. In crafting the Process
Act, Ellsworth and company had attempted the herculean task of sorting through the
diverse state procedural approaches to arrive at a uniform federal system.223 This proved
overly ambitious for at least two reasons. First, considering the attachment various
&RQJUHVVPHQ KDG WR WKHLU RZQ VWDWHV DQG WKH VWDWH EDUV¶ RYHUVL]HG UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ LQ
&RQJUHVV (OOVZRUWK¶V DWWHPSW ZDV ERXQG WR FROOLGH ZLWK WKH ³DJH-old professional
PDODG\RIUHVLVWLQJSURFHGXUDOFKDQJH´224 6HFRQGHYHQJUDQWLQJ(OOVZRUWK¶VQXPHURXV
good faith overtures across the political aisle, the Anti-Federalists were relentless in
pursuing a ³sustained offensive . . . against a µFRQVROLGDWHGJRYHUQPHQW¶´²and they saw
this as yet another opportunity to resist federal control. 225
$FFRUGLQJO\ ZKHQ WKH 6HQDWH FRPPLWWHH¶V GUDIW RI WKH 3URFHVV $FW ZDV ILQDOO\
reported near the end of the session, it was met with a wave of opposition that sunk the
ship of federal procedural uniformity, at least for the time being. The result, then, was
that even in the limited sphere of jurisdiction they had been given, federal courts would
have to use state procedures and, for cases raising common law questions, state causes of
action.226 Numerous scholars recognize this as a victory for the Anti-Federalists.227 As
220. Although a Federalist, consider William Maclay¶s characteristically provocative summary of his
objection to the bill:
I opposed this bill from the beginning. It certainly is a vile law system, calculated for expense and
with a design to draw by degrees all law business into the Federal courts. The Constitution is meant
to swallow all the State Constitutions by degrees, and thus to swallow, by degrees, all the State
judiciaries.
See, e.g., JOURNAL OF WILLIAM MACLAY, UNITED STATES SENATOR FROM PENNSYLVANIA, 1789±1791, at 114
(Edgar Stanton Maclay ed., 1890).
221. See An Act to Regulate Processes in the Courts of the United States (discussing 1 Stat. 93 (1789)
(repealed 1792)), in 4 DHSC, supra note 199, at 114±15.
222. See GOEBEL, supra note 6, at 509.
223. Id. at 512, 514.
224. Id. at 511.
225. Id. at 510.
226. See, e.g., Bellia & Clark, supra note 17, at 629. Bellia and Clark¶s article raises yet another reason why
the Anti-Federalists might not have been given the credit they are due for the original federal judiciary over the
years. Namely, for a long time, scholars have misunderstood the nature of the federal common law, believing
that federal courts could themselves make up federal causes of action based on ³ambient of general law´ as
suggested in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). This was not the case. Instead, because of the
Process Acts, federal courts were bound to use state law forms of proceeding when hearing cases based on the
common law. Id. at 611±13.
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Anthony Bellia, Jr. and Bradford Clark put the point (in relation to both the 1789 and
1792 Acts):
In important ways, the Process Acts were a victory for anti-Federalists against proponents
of centralized federal judicial power. The Acts denied federal courts the power to devise a
uniform system of federal causes of action that potentially could have undermined state
interests. The Acts also prevented the development of two fundamentally different
remedial systems in the same state, thereby sparing litigants and lawyers the need to learn a
new system.228

Accordingly, even on this occasion when Ellsworth thought it necessary to side
with federal uniformity, the first Congress landed on the other side.
CONCLUSION
Having now canvassed four key moments in the establishment of the United States
judiciary²the Constitutional Convention, the ratification debates, the state ratifying
conventions, and the first Congress²the payoff should be clear: it was not primarily the
)HGHUDOLVWV¶ WKHRUHWLFDO DSSURDFK WKDW VKDSHG WKH RULJLQDO IHGHUDO MXGLFLDU\ LW ZDV WKH
Anti-)HGHUDOLVWV¶ Taken together, the Bill of Rights, the Judiciary Act, and the Process
Act demonstrate how the first Congress responded to the Anti-)HGHUDOLVWV¶FULWLFLVPVE\
carefully circumscribing the jurisdiction of the federal courts, using state courts to check
the expansion of federal power, increasing the connection between the execution of
federal law and local juries, and tying federal forms of action and procedures to the
states. $V HPSKDVL]HG DERYH (OOVZRUWK¶V GHFLVLRQ QRW WR JUDQW IHGHUDO FRXUWV JHQHUDO
³DULVLQJXQGHU´MXULVGLFWLRQHVSHFLDOO\XQGHUFXWWKHFRUHSULQFLSOHRIWKHVirginia Plan by
allowing state courts to execute and interpret the bulk of federal law. And this decision is
all the more striking once one recalls that the key component of Madisonian
federalism²WKHIHGHUDOJRYHUQPHQW¶VSRVVHVVLRQRIVRPHPHDQVWRSURWHFt against state
intransigency²was now housed in the judicial branch.
The first implementation of Article III thus represents the Anti-)HGHUDOLVWV¶ PRVW
unequivocal political victory. Even if their influence on the federal judiciary was
eventually outlasted, their success in establishing this point of departure significantly
GHOD\HG WKH IHGHUDO MXGLFLDU\¶V PDWXUDWLRQ DQG VKRXOG EH UHPHPEHUHG DV D FULWLFDO
turning point in the evolution of the American political experiment. There is also a
certain irony to the Anti-)HGHUDOLVWV¶VXFFHVV By limiting the creation and jurisdiction of
WKH IHGHUDO FRXUWV WKH\ KHOSHG EULQJ +DPLOWRQ¶V SUHGLFWLRQ LQWR UHDOLW\ The original
federal judiciary was the least dangerous branch²at least for a while.

227. See, e.g., id. at 647; 4 DHSC, supra note 204, at 108 (³[A]s with the Judiciary Act, those who favored a
strong, centralized federal court system had to contend with those who feared a loss of autonomy by the
individual states,´ and ³[a]lthough reports of the congressional debates are sparse, it is apparent that the
advocates of state interests carried the day´); GOEBEL, supra note 6, at 539±40 (³If there was truth in the
antifederalists¶ charge that the most ardent federalists were aiming at a µconsolidated¶ government, the Act for
Regulating Processes in its final form was a defeat for such ambitions.´).
228. See Bellia & Clark, supra note 17, at 647.
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